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ABSTRACT 
currently, three factors are re-shaping the u.s. Navy as 
it enters the 21st Century. First, as a result of the end of 
the Cold War, a new strategic direction has been mapped out by 
the Navy in"··· From the Sea." Secondly, with the dramatic 
advances in microcomputers and information technologies, the 
Navy has the opportunity to embark on a "Military Technolog-
ical Revolution." Lastly, significant resource constraints 
will limit the Navy's ability to develop, procure, and 
maintain forces. 
This study considers the implications of these three 
factors for the development of a Maritime Reconnaissance 
Strike Complex (MRSC) . Forces incorporated within an MRSC are 
then analyzed and compared in terms of capital value and 
operating and support costs. The results provide one approach 
to developing an investment strategy for future forces in an 
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A. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
over the past three years, the United States Navy has had 
to dramatically shift its vision of how the service will 
contribute to the future defense of the country. In an era of 
unfolding world events only recently thought highly unlikely 
or altogether impossible, the Navy is having to completely re-
evaluate its purpose, missions and force structure. Enemies 
that for years, presented a formidable, ·yet predictable, 
challenge to the national security of the United States, have 
ceased to exist. In their place, less formidable but also 
less predictable foes have attracted the attention of defense 
planners. 
In addition to the dynamic changes occurring on the 
geopolitical scene, domestic concerns over the burgeoning 
federal debt have prompted a significant decline in funding 
for the armed forces. Programs and weapons systems deemed 
necessary only a few years ago are being dramatically reduced 
or cancelled altogether. Personnel drawdowns are occurring at 
a rate few believed possible only a short while ago. Military 
bases and facilities, whose existence seemed permanent in the 
communities in which they were located, are being closed down. 
Technology, too, is changing rapidly. The conduct of 
Operation Desert Storm portends what many believe is a 
1 
Military Technological Revolution (MTR) . This MTR is expected 
to completely reshape the way the military will fight its next 
war. The MTR will produce advances in sensors, communica-
tions, 11 smart weapons 11 and electronic warfare, that will 
provide commanders with abilities and "force multipliers" 
never before available. Missions that took hundreds of 
aircraft sorties to complete may now be accomplished by a 
single highly accurate cruise missile or precision guided 
munitions (PGMs). The implication of these advances is that 
traditional measures of military strength (mass, mobility, 
reach and firepower) are being replaced by new criteria that 
aim at "information dominance." This will dictate, in turn, 
the tempo and timing of operations with highly lethal and 
accurate weapons. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 6) 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
Faced with a dynamic geopolitical world, fiscal 
constraints, and a MTR, how should the U.S. Navy proceed to 
plan for and invest in the force of the future? What should 
be the size, composition and cost of the future Navy and how 
might it be streamlined? Needed is a long-range resource 
investment plan. This thesis hopefully contributes some 
insights into developing such a plan. 
One military organizational concept, originally developed 
by the Soviet military leader ship, and discusse d in the next 
chapter, is to build forces around a "Reconnaissance-Strike 
2 
Complex" (RSC) . Composed of a "highly integrated and 
automated system of reconnaissance, control systems and firing 
platforms," the RSC way of envisioning naval forces of the 
future seems to suit the needs of military planners in an era 
of diminished resources, dynamic world geopolitics and rapid 
technological change. (Hazlett, 1993, p. 2) As is analyzed 
in Chapters V and VI, forces organized as a RSC can be more 
cost-efficient and effective. Their mission will be to "turn 
inside the enemy's decision cycle" and prevail in combat in 
the five battle space environments of the future-air, land, 
sea, space, and the electromagnetic spectra. (Tuttle, 1992, 
p. 9) 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses these specific questions: 
1. How might the u.s. Navy of the early 21st century differ 
from today's force with regard to size and composition, 
and how much will it cost in capital investment and 
operating and support costs? 
2. What is the range of capital and operating and support 
costs for a u.s. Navy configured around the concept of 
an "maritime" RSC (MRSC)? 
3. Assuming a continuing trend of diminished resources for 
procurement and operating and support costs, how might 
the ratio of operating and support costs to capital 
value change? 
4. What challenges are encountered in attempting to 
estimate costs for an MRSC, and how might these 
challenges be resolved to promote a better understanding 
of the relationships between the size, composition, and 
cost of an MRSC? 
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D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis limits consideration of the potential 
components of a MRSC to Navy and Marine Corps afloat assets 
that typically forward deploy. It does not include any land-
based forces, but operating and support costs of shore-based 
support infrastructure of afloat assets are included. Two 
MRSCs are reviewed: one called MRSC-Desert Storm (MRSC-DS), 
and a projected force in the year 2015, called MRSC-2015. 
Forces organized around an MRSC are designed to cope with a 
Major Regional Conflict (MRC), and do not address other 
contingencies, e.g., strategic deterrence, peacekeeping/ 
special operations, or peacetime forward presence; all could 
place additional requirements on ship types and numbers. In 
addition, this research does not consider the contributions of 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships, Allied forces, or Military 
Sealift shipping. 
This thesis does not attempt to determine spending levels 
for individual service appropriation accounts, but rather 
provides a Department of Defense-wide view of the funding 
needs in the broad areas of capital investment (e.g., 
procurement and research and development) and operating and 
support costs to field an MRSC. However, the discussion 
includes references to these individual accounts. Cost data 
genera ted in determining costs as sociated with the space-based 
portion of an MRSC are of a rough order of magnitude; 
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estimates are not considered to be as accurate as the costing 
associated with Navy and Marine Corps forces. 
It is assumed that the reader of this thesis has a working 
knowledge of Navy programming and budgeting concepts, and the 
current (1994) size and composition of the U.S. Navy, and that 
he/she is familiar with the Navy's contribution during 
Operation Desert Storm. 
E. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
This research is limited to unclassified sources only. 
Data are gathered from Department of Defense (DOD) documents, 
trade journals, books, articles, and various studies and 
reports. Sources also include input from National Defense 
University personnel, the Congressional Budget Office, Air 
Force Space Command and the center for Naval Analyses. In 
determining operating and support costs, the Quick Cost Model 
is utilized. 
F. RECENT U.S. NAVY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 
Over the past several years, the Navy's strategic concept 
has changed at a bewildering pace. In the 1970s, the concept 
stressed defense of the transatlantic "seabridge" in support 
of a conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe. The 
"Maritime strategy" of the 1980s emphasized "forward 
operations" by a 600-ship fleet against the Soviet fleet in 
horne waters. Since then, "The Way Ahead" and finally " ... 
From the Sea" have taken the Navy away from a preoccupation 
5 
with a "global blue-water engagement" with the Soviets, to 
planning for regional conflicts in littoral waters. Some 
people claim that "land control" has replaced "sea control" as 
the Navy's principal task. (Breemer, 1994, p. 49) The DOD 
document "The Bottom Up Review," completed in September 1993, 
has reaffirmed the Navy's role in projecting power"··· From 
the Sea." 
1. The Maritime Strategy (MS) 
This strategic concept of the 1980s originated with 
the efforts of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Thomas 
B. Hayward, in the 197 Os, to develop an offensive naval 
strategy aimed at forward operations in Soviet home waters. 
The classified version of the MS was published in 1984; its 
unclassified counterpart appeared in January 1986. 
(Hattendorf, 1988, p. 17) It portrayed an "era of violent 
peace, 11 in which conflict could rapidly escalate from peace-
time naval presence, to a crisis, and ultimately, global war. 
The "threat" was a Soviet Navy designed to protect the Soviet 
homeland and its ballistic missile submarines, while Soviet 
ground and air forces staged a massive offensive against NATO-
Europe. The MS called for U.S. Navy forces to respond through 
a series of successive phases: first, deterrence: next, 
taking the initiative should deterrence fail; thirdly, taking 
the fight to the enemy; and finally, war termination. 
(Watkins, 1986, pp. 9-13) 
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The MS was to have been built around a U.S. Navy of 
600 ships, including 15 aircraft carrier battle groups 
{CVBGs), 100 nuclear powered attack submarines {SSNs), and 
four battleship surface action groups (SAGs) • Then-Secretary 
of the Navy John Lehman emphasized this point when he defended 
the 600 ship Navy as a means to support a strategy that was 
•.. "global, forward deployed and superior to our probable 
opponents." {Lehman, 1986, p. 36) 
2. The Way Ahead 
With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, a fundamental 
shift in the balance of military power occurred. In an effort 
to adapt to this change, the Navy promulgated "The Way Ahead." 
It was designed to support President Bush's National Security 
Strategy of deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and 
force reconstitution. The Navy recognized that it had to 
shift its focus away from a single global threat to a multi-
threat regional environment, and that the MS emphasis on 
oceanic operations had become incompatible with the shallow 
water, confined operating environments that were likely to 
characterize future regional conflicts. {Garret, 1991, p. 
38). The presence of nuclear powered aircraft carriers in the 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea during "Desert Storm" exemplified the 
Navy's dramatic departure from the open ocean engagement 
scenarios of the MS. 
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3. From the Sea 
In September 1992, the Navy completed its doctrinal 
disengagement from the MS, and embraced an entirely new 
concept entitled " ... From the Sea" (FTS). Focused on 
"littoral warfare" and "operational maneuver from the sea," 
FTS' s "strategic direction" represents a fundamental shift 
' 
from the open-ocean warf ighting on the sea toward joint 
operations conducted from the sea. (O'Keefe, 1992, p. 2) 
This shift means, among other things, direct instead of 
indirect participation by naval forces with other forces in 
penetrating land defenses. 
The Navy's new focus on war on land has brought an 
entirely new set of challenges. Problems such as "piercing 
the littoral fog" and trying to "remove the fog of battle" in 
a totally new environment with far more numerous contacts and 
additional complexities (e.g., shallow, small bodies of water, 
land based threats such as short-range missiles, friendly as 
well as unfriendly forces etc.) need to be resolved. This will 
require improved battle management and interoperability, 
command, control and communications (C3), etc. Near-land 
capabilities, and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) are 
among the many challenges and opportunities that need to be 
appreciated and built into naval warfare forces of the future. 
Another different direction for the Navy centers 
around its historic role as a forward-deployed expeditionary 
"presence" force. The traditional building block of the u.s. 
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Navy, the aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG), will hence-
forth serve as the centerpiece of a new afloat organization, 
called the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF} . An NETF can 
be broken down further into smaller Task Groups (TGs), 
centered about either a large amphibious ship or a large deck 
aircraft carrier. Joint Expeditionary Force "packages," with 
a mix of different assets, are to be "tailored" to provide 
commanders with the right type of forces for different 
missions. The direct link between the aircraft carrier and 
its air wing has been softened to allow a broader mix of 
embarked capabilities (i.e. , Marine Corps aviation) . New 
initiatives to ensure air superiority in and about littoral 
waters, including long-range precision strike or standoff 
weapons, have come into focus. SSNs that were previously 
employed in mostly an independent manner against the Soviet 
blue-water fleet, are to be integrated into task forces, and 
are to be capable of shallow water anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW). Surface combatants which have thus far principally 
been employed in support of the carriers, will be used more 
flexibly in new roles. All in all 1 the Navy is set for a new 
direction in-operational capabilities, notably in the areas of 
command, control, and communications, battlespace dominance, 
power projection and force sustainment. 
4. Force 2001 
FTS's vision has been translated into a programmatic 
framework, entitled "Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. 
9 
Navy", published in July 1993. Besides incorporating the new 
concept of expeditionary warfare, it also details the 
reorganization of the Navy staff, notably the subordination of 
the three platform "barons" (CVs, surface combatants, and 
submarines), under a single "Navy voice. 11 (Kelso, 1993, p. 
21) Along with the staff reorganization, a Joint Mission Area 
(JMA) Assessment process has been established. It is designed 
to ensure that six mission and two support areas are matched 
more efficiently and effectively in terms of required capabil-
ities and fiscal limitations. New programmatic thinking is 
also evident, notably in the areas of standoff and sensor-
fuzed weapons, shallow water anti-submarine and mine warfare, 
naval surface fire support, surveillance, and TBMD. 
s. The Bottom Up Review 
Initiated in March 1993, "The Bottom Up Review" (BUR) 
provides a blueprint for planning and implementing a national 
military strategy for the 21st century. It incorporates three 
fundamental principles. First, u.s. forces, alone or allied 
with friendly countries, are to be able to fight and win two 
nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). Second, 
the u.s. is to retain its status as a world power, and not 
return to isolationism. And finally, the United States will 
maintain the fighting readiness of its armed forces. (Aspin, 
19 9 3 , pp. 1-2) 
According to the BUR, the threats that face the u.s. 
now and in the near future are the dangers posed by nuclear 
10 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) , regional 
dangers, dangers to democracy and reform, and economic 
dangers. The BUR proposes a balanced force mix for addressing 
each of these challenges at a cost that will not undermine the 
nation's ability to bolster its economy as it faces more 
aggressive competition on a global scale. Using a "building 
block" methodology, the BUR defines four broad classes of 
potential military operations: MRCs, smaller scale conflicts 
or crises, overseas presence, and deterring attacks by WMDs. 
For each of the major threats, the BUR offers a vision 
on how the Navy will structure its future forces. It echoes 
and reinforces FTS, by highlighting the service's re-
orientation away from "blue water" towards the initiatives for 
coping with sea, air, land, and space threats in near-land 
areas. In addressing new nuclear dangers, counterprolifera-
tion efforts are to include upgrading of general purpose and 
special operation forces, as well as the development of cruise 
missiles and TBMD to protect forward-deployed forces. In 
order to deter regional dangers, overseas presence, including 
the permanent stationing or long-term deployment of U.S. 
maritime forces, joint training with allies, and preposition-
ing of equipment are emphasized. 
U.S. maritime forces have the ability to quickly 
deploy and concentrate and engage in most any area of the 
world. They therefore seem well-suited to carry out the BUR's 
four phases of sea-land combat. These include: 
11 
Phase 1: Halting the invasion. This would include 
delaying and disrupting of enemy ground forces by land and 
sea-based strike weapons, including aircraft armed with "smart 
munitions" and unmanned standoff weapons. TBMD of friendly 
forces, possibly from surface ships or submarines, and 
establishment of air superiority by carrier-based aircraft, 





and achieve and maintain sea-air-land-space 
Isolation and destruction of enemy forces. 
Counteroffensive operations, including 
flanking maneuvers, Marine amphibious invasions, and use of 
air power with PGMs for deep interdiction strikes, 
complemented by special forces operations and sea-based fire 
support. 
Phase 4: Underwrite the post-hostility stability of 
the region by, for example, the continued presence of naval 
forces. 
In planning forces for the future, the MRC "building 
block" approach was developed to also include force "enhance-
ments," which upgrade the carrier's strike potentia'l through 
modification of aircraft and PGMs. 
6. Global Presence 
As the Navy's c~rrier force levels have declined, much 
concern has been expressed over the possible negative impact 
on regional stability, notably the U.S. ability to respond to 
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or deter Third World crises. (O'Rourke, 1991, p. 1) Tradi-
tionally deployed in the three 11 hub 11 areas, i.e., the 
Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, an the Western Pacific, 
carriers have been the mainstay of u.s. presence and influence 
in these regions. Questions are: What areas will be least 
affected by the carriers' departure? Can surface or 
amphibious ships be adequate substitutes, etc. Possible 
solutions, such as relocating carriers to overseas homeports, 
increasing personnel tempo, added reliance on land-based 
aircraft or ground forces, or increased allied participation, 
have all been considered. (O'Rourke, 1991, pp. 2-3) 
In an effort to solve the problem and adhere to fiscal 
constraints, a force level of 11 active and one reserve/ 
training carrier has been agreed upon. Aviation-capable 
amphibious ships with AV-8B attack jets and attack 
helicopters, and Aegis-equipped surface ships, will play a 
more prominent role. These forces are to be complemented by 
SSNs and maritime patrol aircraft. "Adaptive Joint Force 
Packages 11 are being developed in an effort to take greater 
advantage of the assets of other services. (Aspin, 1993, p. 
25) 
7. Forces for the Future 
Traditional military force structures and organiza-
tions may not be suitable for the post-Cold War geopolitical 
environment. In order to remain effective, the U.S. needs 
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forces that can not only win wars, but also, and even more 
important, deter conflict. 
Forces of the future will need to exhibit less raw 
military strength (mass, firepower, etc.), but be tailored 
instead to influence the direction of geopolitical events. 
(Rothrock, 1993, p. 2). Issues such as the guerilla war in 
Bosnia and the Iraqi repression of the Kurds are as likely to 
occur in the future as "conventional" military aggression. If 
the Cold War could be thought of as a "heavyweight boxing 
match" between the United States and Soviet Union, today's 
situation is analogous to a "kickboxing match," with more 
ways to attack, or be attacked, by far more numerous potential 
opponents. (Rothrock, 1993, p. 2) 
Simply downsizing the forces of the 1980s and early 
1990s will not be the answer to present and future challenges. 
Instead, the smaller forces fielded need to be more effective 
and provide "leverage," if the United States is to remain 
credibly engaged on the world scene. Leverage depends not 
only the explicit displays of wealth and military power, but 
also includes the implicit concerns of a nation's political 
tolerance for risk and suffering. (Rothrock, 1993, p. 3) In 
the "Information Age" the United States is more exposed and 
vulnerable, and has more to lose strategically than a third 
world aggressor. Even minor enemy military successes (e.g., 
the tragic loss of 28 lives at the Army Reservist's barracks 
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during the Persian Gulf War) can have disproportionate 
consequences for the image of u.s. military prowess. Rather 
than trying to provide an "arithmetic" response of simply 
assigning additional units to a battle the United States may 
not want to fight, the Nation should concentrate on trying to 
"shape the conflict" to its advantage with forces available, 
and thus avoid the "pitiful giant" syndrome. (Rothrock, 1993) 
New political, economic and technological realities ••• 
especially sensitivity to casualties (even the enemy's), 
undermine the credibility of U.s. traditional "strength" 
(attrition) strategy. (Rothrock, 1993) As a result, stealthy 
platforms such as submarines and aircraft will continue to be 
needed in the implementation of u.s. defense planning designed 
to minimize exposure of forces while still effectively 
carrying out assigned missions. 
What then, are the implications for u.s. force 
structure of the future? As downsizing occurs, how does the 
United States "rightsize" its forces? Useful initiatives 
should include: 
limit the density of forces that are exposed to enemy 
lethality by achieving through standoff platforms many 
of the objectives traditionally achieved in situ. 
limit the logistics presence exposed. 
increase the spectrum of non-lethal options to deal with 
situations where the conflict itself is the enemy (e.g., 
Balkans) . 




Strategy and force planning initiatives viewed from an 
Air-Land-Sea perspective will evolve towards an Air-Land-Sea-
Space-Electromagnetic Spectrum. Although innovations through 
technology, doctrine and organization on earth will partially 
answer the 11 rightsizing 11 questions of the future military, 
U.S. forces are still subject to highly lethal enemy capabil-
ities (as the result of technology transfers). It is in space 
where the United States will be technologically able to 
achieve the effects of mass without the vulnerabilities of 
density. (Rothrock, 1993) 
a. summary 
In this introductory chapter, recent u.s. Navy 
strategic concepts have been discussed. In the next chapter, 
the MTR is discussed and the concept of the MRSC is 
introduced. Chapters III and IV present force structures 
illustrating the MRSC concept. Chapter V contains a detailed 
analysis and comparison of the two MRSCs with regard to 
capital value and operating and support costs. Chapter VI is 
a summary, recommendations, and conclusion. 
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II. THE U.S. NAVY AND THE MTR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. military forces stand on the brink of what many 
specialists have described as a Military Technological 
Revolution (MTR). (Goure, 1993, Mazarr, 1993) Some charac-
teristics of this MTR include the following: 
"real time 11 exploitations of battlespace information; 
small, lightweight, extremely powerful microcomputers; 
stealth technologies; 
spaced-based assets. 
Military forces can exploit a MTR only through appropriate 
organizational and doctrinal changes, and not by relying 
solely on technological advancements. 
Insofar as the U.S. military adopts the MTR model for 
force development, the u.s. Navy will play a significant role. 
In an era of fiscal restraint, that role will be limited by 
the cost of the resources associated with Navy participation. 
This chapter spells out the potential of the MTR, and sets the 
groundwork for the cost estimating process pursued in the 
following chapters. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
What are the implications of the MTR, and what influence 
will it have on the u.s. military of tomorrow? A recent study 
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defined an MTR as "· .. a timely combination of innovative 
technologies, doctrine, and military organizations that is 
reshaping the ways in which wars are fought." (Mazarr, 1993, 
p. 1). When hearing the term, one envisages military forces 
operating with technologically advanced weapons. Yet, a great 
deal more than weapons alone are involved. Take, for example, 
the German blitzkrieg in the opening days of World War II. By 
utilizing a weapon already known to the Allies, the tank 
(first introduced by the British during World War I) , and 
organizing it into Panzer divisions together with close air 
support (the airplane had also been used extensively during 
World War I) , the Germans achieved phenomenal success against 
France in 1940. (Goure, 1993, p. 175) The French owned 
roughly as many tanks as the Germans, some of which were 
superior to the German ones. The difference was that the 
French army had failed to grasp the "revolutionary capability" 
that could be attained by giving the tank its own "logic," 
i.e., a doctrine and an organization to maximize its potential 
as a combat weapon. Instead of employing the tank as a 
separate str ing arm, the French used it as another infantry 
support weapon to be spread around the battlefield. 
(Arguilla, 1993, p. 163} 
The current use of the term "Military Technological 
Revolution" can be traced back to Soviet military thought in 
the early-1980s (Fitzgerald, 1993, p. 3). Western inter-
preters have defined the MTR as involving "the innovative 
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application of advancing technology in the form of new 
capabilities at the levels of doctrine, strategy, operational 
art, tactics, organization, and training in order to achieve 
significant improvements in military performance." (Goure, 
1993, p. 178) More than just technological innovation and 
novel equipment is involved. A MTR implies a "quantum leap" 
in the utilization of military capability. 
One way to look at the concept of an MTR is to consider 
the "catalytic" effect of technological advancement in 
weaponry on military doctrine and organization. In this 
sense, an MTR can be defined as a fundamental advance in 
technology which acts as an "engine of change" for the way 
wars are fought. (Goure, 1993, p. 177) 
1. An Historical Perspective 
Technological advancement is, by definition a 
prerequisite for a military-technological revolution. Techno-
logical innovation over the centuries has included gunpowder, 
muskets and cannons, the mechanization of war, wireless 
communication, and most recently, electronic and nuclear 
capabilities. All were true advances in technological 
capabilities, but only when they were combined with 
organizational and doctrinal changes did those technologies 
revolutionize the conduct of war. 
In his book, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond, 
Richard J. Dunn provides some historical examples of how 
technological innovation, coupled with organizational and 
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doctrinal changes, can dramatically change the nature and 
paradigm of warfare. Another example were the heavy battle-
field casualties of the First World War, when as a result of 
dramatic improvements in ·the accuracy and lethality of 
artillery, barbed wire, and the machine gun, frontal assaults 
against a well-prepared defender became futile. (Dunn, 1992, 
p. 16) 
These examples point out how technological innovation, 
when combined with changes in organization and doctrine, can 
overturn the way wars are fought. Three steps are involved: 
First, the technological "engine of change" must provide 
some new opportunity which can be exploited against an 
enemy on the battlefield. 
Second, technological innovation must be recognized and 
articulated. A "sponsor" with a vision as to how wars 
in the future will be fought needs to promote the 
concept. 
Third, an individual or body of individuals who is in a 
position of authority to change how things are done 
needs to grasp the opportunity, and re-orient current 
doctrine and organizations towards a new paradigm. 
(Dunn, 1992, p. 17) 
Then, and only then, will evolutionary technological 
change be transformed into revolutionary change in warfare 
concepts, and become a "Military Technological Revolution". 
2. The MTR on the Military Paradigm 
In presenting the concept and implications of the MTR, 
one approach is to discuss its "elements." These include: 
(l) an integrating framework (doctrine and organization), (2) 
a set of enabling capabilities (information dominance, command 
and control, simulation, training and agility), and (3), an 
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array of executing capabilities (strike systems, such as smart 
and exotic weapons and major platforms). (Mazarr, 1993, p. 
18) These elements may be envisioned as constituting a 
"pyramid," in which doctrine and organization are the founda-
tion, the enabling capabilities are the middle layer, and the 
executing capabilities are at the top. The importance of each 
element's revolutionary contribution can be envisioned in 
terms of the area of the pyramid which each element occupies. 
The point is that doctrine and organization are the most 
influential. 
Doctrine and organization need to be tailored so that 
each technological advance can be employed to the maximum 
advantage. It requires leadership with the ability to look 
into the future and conceptualize how the next war will be 
fought. A new strategy based on "information dominance" can 
set the stage for new doctrinal approaches for all 
warfighters. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 2) These concepts and 
approaches will be framed by understanding and integrating 
reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) 
systems, developing new command and control options and 
strategies, and adopting new organizational structures. 
(Wolfert, 1993, p. 2) Service parochialism, proponents of 
specific platforms, and traditional roles and missions need to 
be completely re-evaluated if there to be an honest effort 
in assessing how wars of the future will be fought. As one 
expert concluded recently: " ... overcoming this parochialism 
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may require strengthening further the joint elements of our 
armed forces so that both the unique and the overlapping 
capabilities of the services can be quickly accessed and 
utilized; i.e., ensuring that the most cost-effective mix can 
be effected rapidly when needed." (Krepinevich, 1994, p. 9) 
Doctrine has traditionally lagged behind new weapon 
systems and technologies (Goure, 1993, p. 175). If doctrine 
and organization are the 11 horse 11 and technology advances in 
weapon systems the "cart, 11 military planners have all too 
often put the cart before the horse. The French use of the 
machine gun as a field piece during the Franco-Prussian War is 
an example. (Arquilla, 1993, p. 153) Yet there may be good 
· reasons why the cart is commonly placed before the horse: it 
is usually only in war, that the doctrinal implications of 
novel weapons become evident. 
The true challenge comes in trying to develop doctrine 
and an organization that recognize and keep up with techno-
logical change. In his book Race to the Swift, Richard 
Simpkin discussed this problem. He found a 50-year cycle of 
innovations in battlefield mobility and theorizing, and 
compared this with an organizational inertia of 30-50 years, 
i.e., it was 30-50 years between the time a radical change in 
equipment appeared and its full-scale employment. (Simpkin, 
1985, p. 5) He attributed most of this to the time it takes 
for "innovating officers" to rise through the ranks to a 
position of influence and leadership. Perhaps this is also 
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partially due to the episodic demands placed on the military 
environment compared with the steady demands for change in the 
commercial sector. (Goure, 1993, p. 177) 
With the technological capabilities envisioned in the 
MTR, shifts in emphasis are occurring that need to be 
appreciated. "Precision warfare" is expected to emerge as the 
successor to maneuver warfare, not making it obsolete, but 
incorporating into the maneuver concept new forms of battle-
field lethality and visibility. (Dunn, 1992, p. 39) New 
technologies will further erase the sharp boundary between sea 
and land. (Odom, 1993, p. 53) The result will be for the 
Navy to further project power inland, as envisioned in FTS. 
Space and electronic warfare (SEW), and the destruc-
tion or neutralization of enemy SEW targets in the five 
environments (space, air, land, sea, and the electromagnetic 
spectrum) will continue to gain importance. (Tuttle, 1992, p. 
7) In broad terms, warfare support and warfare disciplines 
will help maintain control of space to enhance battle manage-
ment capabilities. If an enemy becomes deaf, dumb and blind, 
confusion results, and he becomes a relatively easy target for 
precision interdiction and strike. (Goure, 1993, p. 180) 
Joint operations and a joint doctrine will continue to 
grow in importance. Extended strike campaigns may emerge, 
with round-the-clock operations, using a wide range of joint 
capabilities, and providing the ability to strike at a wide 
variety of targets. (Mazarr, 1993, p. 34) Mobility and 
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flexibility of forces will need to be considered, and their 
proximity to weapons of mass destruction must be minimized. 
As a result, lighter equipped forces, tailored to existing 
lift capabilities, will need to be incorporated into doctrine. 
(Mazarr, 1993, p. 34) 
With dramatic improvements in communication and 
command and control, a temptation on the part of commanders 
far from the front may be to "micromanage" local and tactical 
operations. Doctrinal changes will need to be incorporated to 
address these issues. (Odom, 1993, p. 50) 
Organizational challenges occur as a result of the 
MTR. Military organizations have traditionally resisted 
change. Unlike the commercial world, where both technical and 
organizational innovation occur more rapidly, the military 
environment is slow to change. (Goure, 1993, p. 182) Part of 
the reason is that commercial organizations, which maximize 
output for a given input, are inherently efficient. Military 
organizations concentrate predominantly on effectiveness, 
rather than efficiency. Mission accomplishment, "victory at 
any cost", has been the norm. One of the challenges of the 
MTR is for the military to become both efficient and 
effective. 
The traditional, vertical or pyramidal organization of 
the past will become unworkabl e . Rather, a "Hi-Flex" organi-
zation may evolve, providing tactical commanders (line 
managers) with a molecular vice pyramid-shaped hierarchy, 
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allowing them to operate more freely. (Ross, 1990, p. 25) 
This would allow for many traditional headquarters level 
decisions to be deferred to field commanders, thus empowering 
the latter with added flexibility, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. The result would be to put control where the 
operation is, to enhance "real time" decision-making, and to 
encourage the ability to contribute. (Ross, 1990, p. 25) 
Innovative force packages and composite air wings 
symptomize the emergence of force structures with more 
flexible, multiple combat teams. (Mazarr, 1993, p. 35) This 
trend will continue as the four services combine assets to 
conduct attack operations with the maximum efficiency and 
effectiveness. (Kendall, 1992, p. 26) 
Special operations forces, lightly equipped and non-
traditional in make-up, will probably play a larger role in 
future operations. Less reliant on logistics and supply, they 
will have enhanced ability to seize key objectives or prepare 
the battlefield for future operations in a quick and covert 
manner. More technologically current equipment, with a 
reduced development and production cycle, will provide 
frontline units added capabilities in a more timely manner. 
3. Information Dominance and Command and control 
No area of modern warfare is experiencing such as 
dramatic a change as information systems, and command and 
control. With the technological advances of the microchip, 
large processors and microcomputers, capabilities previously 
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thought unimaginable are now coming to fruition and into 
practical use. Sea changes are occurring in how information 
is collected, stored, processed, and how organizations are 
designed to take advantage of increased information. 
(Arquilla, 1993, p. 143) The revolution in data processing 
and communications capabilities is now reducing the entire 
series of activities involved in information transfer to near 
real-time proportions, and is expanding the availability to 
users. (Kendall, 1992, p. 25) These advances have the 
capability of providing the commander with the means to 
"dispel the fog and friction of war" described by Clauswitz. 
The ongoing revolution in military affairs is rooted firmly in 
the Information Age. (Franck and Hildebrandt, 1993, p. 2) 
Technology has now made it possible to provide near-
real time situational awareness and information to all 
warfighters, providing them with a degree of confidence and 
detail only dreamed of by past commanders. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 
1) Future developments will provide a commander the oppor-
tunity to view the entire theater's battle space instead of 
the area bounded by the visual and tactical radar horizon. 
The Navy's SEW architecture will be constructed as an 
interactive framework that ties together the command and 
control process of afloat tactical commanders, such as the 
Naval Tactical Communication System Afloat (NTCS-A), with the 
CINCs (Commander-In-Chiefs) and supporting shore establish-
ment. (Tuttle, 1992, p. 23) 
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Creation of an "Information Combat" Based Strategy, 
including the establishment of common formats, protocols and 
standards of information, optimal approaches to information 
fusion, and development of a strategy for the fusion and 
dissemination of information and knowledge, will be essential. 
(Wolfert, 1993, p. 14) Perhaps the creation of an "Informa-
tion Corps," designed to accommodate these advances will be 
appropriate. (Hazlett and Libicki, 1993, p. 88) 
Great strides in intelligence collection capability 
have been made and will continue to occur. Sensor systems, 
such as ground and airborne radars, forward-looking infrared, 
long-range electroptics, and satellites, will have the ability 
to peer over distances and through the night, smoke, fog, 
clouds and camouflage to lay bare the smallest details of an 
enemy's disposition. (Dunn, 1992, p. 31) With these 
capabilities, integration of intelligence collection with 
target sensing platforms will occur, providing a set of 
battlefield-wide 11 virtual forward observers," able to direct 
fire on targets immediately. (Kendall, 1992, p. 26) This 
capability can do a lot to remove uncertainty in warfighting, 
in that it allows the warfighter to move quickly through the 
decision cycle of observing, orienting, deciding and acting. 
(Wolfert, 1993, p. 8} 
By providing real-time information useful to the 
attacker, ambiguity and uncertainty are reduced, allowing 
quicker and more lethal action on the part of the warfighter 
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by allowing him to "turn inside the enemy's decision cycle." 
While enhancing this effort, attention will need to be paid to 
denying this capability to adversaries through the manipula-
tion or disruption of the enemy's information loop. 
Space will play an increasingly large role in 
information dominance, and command and control. Handheld 
navigational devices, utilizing data from Global Positioning 
System (GPS) satellites, allow forces to accurately navigate 
over unfamiliar or foreign terrain. "Space lines of communica-
tion" will be established and will need to be sustained and 
defended. (Rothrock, 1993) Reconnaissance, surveillance, 
target acquisition (RSTA) assets in space, combined with 
Airborne Warning and Control (AWACs) , Joint Surveillance 
Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARs), and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles/Remotely Piloted Vehicles (UAVsjRPVs), will need to 
be horizontally and vertically linked so that better cross-
cuing and immediate identical displays can be used by air, 
ground and sea-base command centers. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 12) 
4. Simulation and Training 
Due to the more complex and involved technologies with 
which military forces must deal with, training will become 
even more important. Advances in simulation technology will 
afford forces the opportunity to conduct training previously 
requiring expensive field exe rcises. Simulation technologies, 
including the evolving technology of virtual reality, will 
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allow mechanized units, from platoon to battalions, to 
practice moving and fighting together as cohesive units; naval 
elements to work together as a battle group; and special 
operations forces to rehearse a mission in minute detail. 
(Mazarr, 1993, p. 39) One lesson of the Gulf War was that 
military personnel must be more intensively trained than ever 
before. (Odom, 1993, p. 54) 
5. Agility 
Agility can be defined as the ability of a force to 
act faster than the enemy. (Dunn, 1992, p. 64) Existing 
problems with the new C-17 aircraft, the advancing age of the 
C-141 transport, and a reduction in amphibious and sealift 
capability, have created a movement issue with the potential 
for serious consequences. (Mazarr, 1993, p. 40) 
Solutions include the design of smaller, 1 ighter 
weapons, capable of being transported in large numbers. 
(Mazarr, 1993, p. 40) More radical would be a change in the 
composition of forces that would be deployed to fight the next 
conflict, by, for example, placing a heavier burden on afloat 
strike assets, and less on land-based assets (heavy armored 
units). (Rubright, 1992) 
6. Strike Systems/Major Platforms 
Critical advanced capabilities of sensors for broad 
area search with targeting quality resolution, combined with 
near real-time data processing and communications to support 
mission planning for attack execution, can provide a quantum 
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improvement in the efficiency with which forces can be applied 
on the battlefield. (Kendall, 1992, p. 25) Utilizing these 
sensor inputs, weapons like the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) 
(a navalized version of the Army Tactical Missile System 
(ATACMs)) with improved range, will greatly enhance precision 
strike capabilities against Critical Mobile Targets (CMTs), 
such as enemy air defenses, SCUD-like missile launchers, or 
artillery and coastal defenses. Older platforms, carrying 
precision guided munitions (PGMs) such as the Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions (JDAM), will be capable of destroying even 
mobile-point targets almost as soon as they are detected. 
(Dunn, 1992, p. 26) 
In addition to ensuring destruction of key targets, 
such as command and control, logistics and supply points, 
advanced strike weapons maximize lethality, yet minimize the 
destruction to the surrounding area. This provides useful 
benefit for targets that are in an area of civilian population 
centers. (Mazarr, 1993, p. 41) 
Along with the offensive striking power of precision 
weapons, emphasis must also be placed on the defensive benefit 
of providing TBMD from land as well as from sea. TBMD protec-
tion of the landing zone, port facility, or airhead will be 
essential in projecting U.S. military power ashore and inland. 
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c. WHY A MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE COMPLEX? 
The geopolitical outline of the present and future world 
scene was presented in the first chapter. This chapter has 
reviewed the potential impact of the MTR on the future. It is 
now time to turn towards the question as to how to best 
organize and employ U.S. naval forces of the future in support 
of the nation's military strategy in light of the MTR. One 
means is by organizing naval forces around the concept of a 
"Reconnaissance Strike Complex" (RSC). The concept of a RSC 
has been under study for several years, primarily by Soviet 
(now Russian) strategists. First, it is necessary to 
introduce and explain the concept of a RSC. Next, the 
question of why organizing naval forces around the concept of 
a Maritime RSC (MRSC) must be addressed. 
Originally developed by the Soviet Navy in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s as a way to counter the u.s. Navy carrier 
battle groups, the RSC was envisaged as an 11 integrated and 
highly automated system of reconnaissance, control systems and 
firing platforms. 11 (Vega, 1990, p. 518) Soviet Ground Forces 
introduced similar systems to strike battlefield targets. 
{Vega, 1990, p. 518) This change in strategy became the 
catalyst for the development of new programs and initiatives 
within the Soviet defense establishment. It entailed 
increased emphasis on the development of high-precision 
conventional weapon systems with the capability of performing 
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tasks previously assigned to tactical nuclear systems. (Vego, 
1990, p. 518) 
The rationale for this development was twofold. First, 
advanced conventional weapons were becoming as destructive as 
tactical nuclear weapons, but, because they were non-nuclear, 
were hoped to minimize the opponent's incentive to resort to 
nuclear weapons. (Vego, 1990, p. 518) Secondly, advances in 
highly capable microcomputers not only afforded the ability to 
use reconnaissance, command and control and strike systems 
effectively, but to also integrate and automate them into a 
high speed, high precision system. (Vego, 1990, p. 518) The 
objective was to be able to act and react in real time more 
quickly than the opponent, and thus provide the necessary edge 
to prevail. 
It can be argued that MRSCs have existed before, for 
example RADM Spruance's carrier task force which engaged the 
Japanese fleet off Midway Island in 194 2 . In that battle, 
after land-based aircraft visually located and reported the 
position of the approaching enemy fleet, U.s. carrier air 
power was launched in the decis ive strike of the Pacific War. 
U.S. forces also had the advantage of knowing where to look 
thanks to superb intelligence information provided by shore-
based code breakers. 
Th e orga nization o f an RSC in the Sovie t Armed Forces 
involved three elements; reconnaissance, strike, and command 
and control. Reconnaissance consiste d of a wide varie ty of 
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platforms, e.g., ocean surveillance satellites, manned 
reconnaissance aircraft, ships, submarines, merchants, to 
collect, evaluate and analyze information about the enemy 
fleet. (Vego, 1990, p. 518) Strike centered around cruise 
missile-equipped aircraft, ships and submarines, and coastal 
artillery and missile batteries. (Vego, 1990, p. 520) The 
command and control complex consisted of shipboard and land 
based "command posts" with automated control, target 
designation, navigation and communication systems. (Vego, 
1990, p. 518} Primarily designed to operate up to 500 km and 
deeper into the enemy's area, the RSC was to be used for both 
defensive as well as offensive purposes. (Fitzgerald, 1993, 
p. 43) More recently, the Russians believe that the 
employment and integration of platforms like the E-8 JSTARs 
and E-3 AWACs by the United States in "Desert Storm" amounted 
to an operational RSC. (Fitzgerald, 1993, p. 45) 
What is new about today's RSC is the speed, operating 
range and lethality with which targets can be engaged. 
(Franck, Hildebrandt, 1993, p. 4} With the advance of the 
MTR, a dramatic change in the effectiveness of the RSC becomes 
possible, creating an entirely different playing field for the 
forces of the future. The Russians evidently consider the RSC 
as the future of warfare, and that rapid collection of precise 
data on enemy targets, with subsequent real time target 
designation and immediate assignment of weapons platforms for 
strike (even deep inside enemy territory} is entirely 
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possible. (Fitzgerald, 1993, p. 46) They look at the value 
of information, and how it can be used to speed up the 
"decision cycle", thereby dictating the timing and tempo of 
combat operations, and consequently the strategic and tactical 
paralysis of the enemy. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 18) 
The dramatically different environment which forces of the 
future will face requires that military organizations be "re-
framed." The uncertainty of future warfare requires the 
development of an entirely new perspective on strategy, 
organizations, sensors, networks and tactics. {Hazlett, 1993, 
p. 2) The challenge of geopolitical change and the MTR 
provide opportunities to employ future forces in a more 
effective and efficient manner. In their book, Reframing 
Organization, authors Lee Belman and Terrence E. Deal explain 
how a shift in paradigm is accomplished by viewing experiences 
and events from multiple viewpoints, resulting in a reshaping 
of the organization. They write: "We need versatile and 
flexible leaders who are artists as well as analysts and who 
can reframes experience in the ways that allow them to 
discover and express new issues and possibilities. Reframing-
-the use of multiple lenses--is vital to effective leadership 
and management." (Belman & Deal, 1991, pp. xiv-iv) 
In his paper "Permanent White Water", CDR James A. 
Hazlett, USN, argues that a MRSC is a significant warfare 
concept that satisfies the "rnul tiple lens view" when reframing 
present and future warfare. (Hazlett, 1993, p. 2) By 
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historically examining the Soviet MRSC through the four 
"frames" presented in Belman and Deal's book (structural, 
human resources, political and symbolic), Hazlett provides an 
example of how the concept of an MRSC is appropriate as a 
vehicle for naval strategist to address and overcome contem-
porary and future warfare challenges. 
Hazlett argues that the Soviet MRSC was a strong concept 
that provided the organizational and doctrinal cohesion 
necessary to counter what they perceived as the primary threat 
at the time--the u.s. carrier battle group. The Soviet MRSC 
satisfied the multiple lens analysis and allowed them to 
attempt to counter u.s. naval forces threatening the Soviet 
homeland. (Hazlett, 1993, p. 3), (Vego, 1990, p. 518) 
Applying this concept to the MTR, the MRSC is a tool that can 
help naval strategists visualize naval warfare in the early 
part of the 21st century. 
The MTR's emphasis on information dominance, battle 
management and precision strike, fits well with the MRSC 
emphasis on integrated and highly automated systems of 
reconnaissance, control and firing platforms. Similarly, the 
U.S. concern for reducing force concentrations through the use 
of stand-off weapons is satisfied in a modern MRSC which 
emphasizes a few highly capable, mobile and agile platforms, 
capable of "real time" kill deep inside the non-linear battle-
space. 
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The MRSC of the future stresses a highly efficient and 
joint organization that can react quickly to meet the threat 
in an era of "Just-In-Time" warfare where reaction time is 
minimal. (Hazlett, 1993, p. 3) By fully integrating 
capabilities, a synergy is created whereby the resulting 
product is a far more effective and efficient force. This 
force has the capability to "turn inside" the enemy's decision 
cycle, and direct lethal and precise firepower in a more rapid 
and devastating manner. 
A modern scenario of the futu.re might require a U.S. MRSC 
to engage an enemy consisting of mobile infantry, mechanized 
armor, self-propelled artillery, modern jet fighters and 
attack aircraft, fixed and mobile missile launchers with 
medium-range non-nuclear warheads, sea skimming cruise 
missiles and coastal surface combatants and diesel submarines. 
The enemy would have no capability to influence the battle 
from space, whereas the United States MRSC would have both 
national and theater assets at its disposal. In a highly 
aggressive and quick-paced campaign, rapid interdiction of 
advancing enemy land forces is necessary to stall an attack on 
a friendly country, and allow time for u.s. mainland rein-
forcements to be deployed to the area. 
In such a scenario, the objective of the u.s. MRSC would 
be to project power 11 from the sea" to stall the enemy advance, 
and seize port and air facilities ashore to allow reinforce-
ment. It can be assumed that Maritime Prepositioned Shipping 
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would arrive within one week. Due to deteriorating political 
events, a large u.s. NETF would have had the opportunity to 
deploy beforehand, and would find itself about one to two days 
steaming time from the region. No land based u.s. forces are 
ashore, thus avoiding "threatening gestures" that might upset 
sensitive negotiations. As a result, no logistics support or 
tactical aviation capability would be present to assist the 
u.s. MRSC at the beginning of hostilities. 
In the next chapter, afloat Navy and Marine Corps forces 
necessary to employ an MRSC (MRSC-DS) are presented to provide 
an opportunity for capital value estimations and operating and 
support cost analysis using the Quick Cost Model. Provided as 
a reference point, MRSC-DS is later compared to MRSC-2015, 
which is presented in Chapter IV. 
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III. MRSC-DESERT STORM (OS) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the force structure of MRSC-DS is 
summarized. This force closely resembles the naval and afloat 
amphibious forces present during Operation Desert Storm. It 
is designed to represent a force that could be deployed for 
certain scenarios without other support requirements (e.g., 
Army and Air Force). Next, capital value for various force 
elements within the MRSC is calculated. Lastly, operating and 
support (O&S) costs are estimated using the Quick Cost Model. 
This allows a determination of O&S costs to capital value 
ratios. 
B. FORCE STRUCTURE 
The fundamental building blocks of MRSC-DS are six 
aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs), two Marine Expedi-
tionary Brigades (MEBs), and applicable space assets. Each 
CVBG typically consists of one aircraft carrier and 6 or 7 
ships, consisting of surface combatants, submarines and 
support vessels. (Cheney, 1992, p. 251) The afloat portion 
of each MEB consists of about 16 to 17 amphibious ships. 
(Kelso, 1991, p. A-13) Approximately three notional MEBs are 
equivalent to one Marine division. The space assets building 
block in MRSC-DS includes only that portion of the overall 
total inventory of space assets utilized to support maritime 
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forces. Thus, the combination of sea, amphibious and space 
assets together constitute MRSC-DS, which is able to project 
power 11 from the sea. 11 Table 1 contains the overall ship 
inventory of MRSC-DS, Table 2, the amphibious forces afloat, 
Table 3, the air assets, both fixed and rotary-wing afloat, 
Table 4, the space-based assets, and Table 5 the weapons and 
ordnance. 
TABLE 1. MRSC-DS SHIPS 
Carriers (CV/CVN) ...••• 
Submarines . • • • . • . 
surface combatants . • • 
Large Amphibious Ships 
Other Amphibious . . • . . . 
Mine Countermeasure Ships . . . • . . . 
Combat Support/Replenishment Ships 
Other Combat Logistics Ships . • • . • 












TABLE 2. MRSC-DS AFLOAT AMPHIBIOUS FORCES 
HQ Command Elements . • • • . • 
Combat Service Support Elements 
Infantry Battalions . . . . . . 
Light Armored Infantry Companies 
Tank Companies . . . . . • 
Assault Amphibian Companies •.. 
Recon Companies . . . . . . 
Combat Engineer Companies . 
Anti-Tank Platoon . • . 
Truck Company Det • . • 
Air Control Group (Rot. Wing) 












Note: Information for Tables 1 and 2 taken from "The U.s. Navy 
in Desert Shield, Desert Storm. 11 (Washington, D.C., 
Department of the Navy, May 1991), 11 Conduct of the 
Persian Gulf war-Final Report to Congress." (Washington 
D.C., Department of Defense, April 1992), From Shield to 
Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy and 
Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf. (New York. 
William Morrow, 1992), and author's estimate. 
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TABLE 3. MRSC-DS AIR ASSETS 
Air-Fixed Wing Afloat 
F-14 Tomcat . . . . . . . . . 104 (USN) 
F-18 Hornet . . . . . . . 134 {USN) 
A-6 Intruder . . . . . . . . 50 {USN) 
AV-8B Harrier . . . 26 (USMC) 
S-3 Viking . . . . 41 (USN) 
E-2 Hawkeye . . . . . 30. (USN) 
EA-6B . . . . . . . . . . 27 (USN) 
Air-Rotary Wing Afloat 
AH-1 Cobra . . . . . . . 48 (USMC) 
UH-1 Huey . . . . 48 (USMC) 
CH-46 Sea Knight 86 (18 USN, 68 USMC) 
CH-53 Sea Stallion . . . . . 50 (USMC) 
SH-2/SH-60 . . . . . 46 (USN) 
SH-3 . . . . . . . . . . 36 (USN) 
OH-58 . . . . . . . . 7 (USMC) 
Note: Information for Table 3 taken from "Conduct of the 
Persian Gulf War-Final Report to Congress." (Washington 
D.C., Department of Defense, April 1992), From Shield 
to Storm : High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy and 
Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf. (New York. 
William Morrow, 1992) , and author's estimate. All 
tactical air assets are stationed aboard ship. 
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TABLE 4. MRSC-DS SPACE ASSETS 
Communication Satellites 
Defense System Communication (DSCS) 
Fleet Communication (FLTSATCOM) 
Leased Satellites (LEASAT) 
Mobile Area Comm. (MACSAT) 
Missile Detection Satellites 
Defense Support Program (DSP) 
Meteorological Satellites 
Defense Meteorological Sat. Prog. (DMSP) 
Navigation Satellites 
Global Positioning System (GPS) 









Note: Information contained in Jane's Space Directory (JSD) 
(1993-1994) (Surrey 1 U.K. Jane's Information Group Inc. 
1993) 1 From Shield to Storm (New York. William Morrow. 
1992) 1 Defense Electronics (January 1993) and Wolfert 1 
1994. Numbers of satellites represent an estimate of 
assets used during Operation Desert Storm. 
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TABLE 5. MRSC-DS WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE 
Type CARs BBs rc:u=s DOFF DOGs FFGs SSNs AMPB Tot. 
TMHK --- 64 286 55 - ·- 66 -- 471 
HARP 300 32 128 64 40 64 24 ·-- 652 
SLAM 100 
-- --- -- - -- - -· 
100 
MAV 300 - -- --- -- -- -- ---- 300 
HARM 1500 - --- - - --- - - 1500 
HELF 
- -- - -- - - -
2000 2000 
TOW - --- -- -- - -- - 2000 2000 
HAWK ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 200 200 
STGR ....... _ .... 100 ·--- ... ........... -- ........... --- 400 500 
PHXM 300 ---- --- --- -- -- - -- 300 
SWDR 1500 __ .,._ 
---- ---- ----
........... 
---- 300 1800 
SPRW 1500 ---- --- -- -- --- --- 624 2124 
MK82 9600 --- ---- - - -- - 1400 11 K 
MK83 9600 --- --- --- -- - -- 1400 11 K 




.... ....... 1500 
STDM ,.. ....... -·-· 1106 30 228 320 --- ·--.... 1684 
16" 
---- 2800 --- .......... ........... __ ...... ---- ---- 2800 
5" ---- 12 K 6500 6500 --- __ ...... ---- 3000 28 K 
76mm ---- ---- ........ - .......... ---... 4000 ---- ---- 4000 
MK48 ---- -·-· .......... I ---- ---- ......... 120 .. ........ 120 
MK46 ---- 12 96 78 30 48 .......... --- 264 
ASRC ··-- ............ 98 78 30 ... .......... --- --- 234 
TALD 300 300 
UAVs 50 50 
Note: Information taken from Jane's Fighting Ships (1991-92). 
(Surrey, UK. Jane's Information Group Inc. 1991), From 
Shield to Storm. (New York. William Morrow. 1992), CBO 
Navy Ship Weapons Load Database dated 10 Feb 1994, and 
author's estimate. (K represents thousands of units}. 
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C. MILITARY CAPITAL 
1. Concept 
The next step is to estimate the capital value of 
MRSC-DS, including ships, planes, equipment, space assets and 
weapons. This is followed by a discussion of operating and 
support costs, and the calculation of pertinent ratios. In 
presenting the topic of military capital, five concepts need 
to be presented and understood. They are: investment, 
capital stock, capital services value, benefit, and the 
treatment of R&D costs. 
a. Investment 
"Investment" relates to the inflow of capital in 
a particular year to develop and acquire durable assets. 
(Hildebrandt, 1990, p. 160) Navy investment costs for 
development are detailed in the form of research and develop-
ment accounts (e.g., Research, Development, Test and Evalua-
tion, Navy-RDT&E, N) . For ships, acquisition costs are 
spelled out annually under Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 
(SCN); for aircraft, Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN); and for 
weapons and ordnance, Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) . 
b. Capital Stock 
"Capital stock (or inventory) value" of durable 
assets can be considered a pool of capital goods that has been 
acquired during an earlier period, collected over time, and 
which is still in service. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p. 161) 
Capital stock is valued at replacement cost, which is the 
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amount of money in constant dollars required to replace the 
asset. Because military assets are maintained very carefully, 
it is assumed that no physical deterioration occurs throughout 
the service life. Also, obsolescence of a military asset is 
assumed to occur suddenly at the end of its service life when 
it is replaced. 1 
c. Capital services Value 
The term "capital services value" refers to the 
implicit value of an asset in a particular year. (Hildebrandt, 
1990, p. 161) In this analysis, capital services value takes 
into consideration both the capital stock value of the assets 
as well as their service lives. It may also give account to 
the time value of money. A discussion of the use of an 
interest rate to account for the time value of money appears 
in the next section. 
Capital services value directly relates to the 
ability to recapitalize force structure. "Recapitalization" 
is currently central to attempts of the Department of Defense 
and Navy to plan future forces. For example, during recent 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Secretary of Defense William Perry used the example of 
maintaining a nuclear powered attack submarine force of 45 
boats, each with a 30 year service life. This force would 
1If replacement cost of achieving a certain level of military 
capability is employed, one takes into account obsolescence by 
using a properly constructed price deflator. (Hildebrandt, 1990, 
p. 165) 
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require an average construction rate of 1 1/2 boats/year over 
the long term. (Perry, 1994, p. 5) Assuming a unit cost of 
$1.5 billion per boat, then the capital services value for a 
given year would be $2.25 billion. This topic is discussed 
and analyzed further in Chapter v. 
d. Benefit 
An important link when discussing military capital 
is the relationship of cost versus benefit when acquiring 
additional assets. The unit cost of acquiring an additional 
asset must be balanced by the anticipated benefit over the 
life of the asset. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p. 161) Translating 
this into monetary terms requires consideration of the 
opportunity cost of capital or "discount rate, 11 the concept of 
constant dollars, and the service life of the asset. 
i. Discount Rate 
The discount rate is a cost incurred by 
utilizing capital to invest in durable assets. It reflects 
the cost not only of raising capital, but also opportunity 
cost. 
ii. Constant Dollars 
Constant dollars refer to a monetary 
measure in which the effects of inflation are ignored. By 
valuing assets in constant dollars, a true comparison of 
capital value in two different time periods can be made. This 
is consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
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circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Federal Programs. (OMB, 1992, p. 7) 
iii. Annual Benefits 
Integrating these factors with the 
service life of durable assets, the following relationship 
between one dollar of capital invested and benefits received 
exists: 2 
l B=--:-----t __ l_ 
t•l ( 1 + r) t 
where r is the discount rate, 1 is the service life, and B is 
the annual benefits per procurement dollar. (Hildebrandt, 
1990, p. 162) In this analysis, to emphasize the annualized 
cost of acquiring a capital asset, discounting is ignored. 
Assuming r=O, the relationship simplifies to: 
1 B=-1 
This indicates that the annual benefit received per dollar 
invested is inversely related to the service life of the 
asset. 
2The last dollar spent must equal the discounted annual 
benefits, or: 
1=t B 
c=l ( 1 + r) t 
Solving for B yields the indicated equation. 
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e. R&D Cost 
Research and development (R&D) costs are not 
considered part of the capital services value of MRS C-DS. 
Rather, it is considered a 11 sunk cost 11 of a previous period. 
However, for MRSC-2015, R&D is amortized over the service life 
of the relevant asset and included with the capital services 
value. R&D is treated in this manner since it is a relatively 
11 soft" number that is small when compared to the capital stock 
inventory. This is somewhat consistent with accounting texts 
that amortize R&D rather than expensing it, and thus assumes 
that future benefits will be received. (Hawkins, 1986, p. 
600) Although amortizing R&D with capital services value for 
MRSC-2015 helps to simplify the analysis, it does affect the 
comparability of capital services values of MRSC-DS and MRSC-
2015. In addition, by amortizing R&D and not treating it as 
a set-up or fixed cost, returns to scale are diminished when 
comparing the cost of maintaining more than one MRSC are 
considered in the capital services value. 
2. Ships 
Appendix C lists the capital stock value of ships of 
MRSC-DS. The 11 model 11 for MRSC-DS is the afloat forces avail-
able on the eve of Desert Storm in 1991. 
3. Aircraft 
Appendix D displays the capital stock value of 
aircraft in MRSC-DS. Planes used are the type and quantity 
available on aircraft carriers and ships that deployed during 
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the Gulf War. Two separate quanti ties are presented in 
Appendix D. The "Req." column reflects the number of aircraft 
afloat. The column labeled "Inv." is the overall inventory of 
aircraft needed to support the numbers afloat. By multiplying 
the number of inventory aircraft required by the unit cost, a 
total cost for each aircraft type is obtained. An example of 
this calculation for the F-18 aircraft is shown at the bottom 
of Appendix D. The higher inventory numbers are justified for 
three reasons; training, maintenance and R&D. 
a. Training 
A certain number of aircraft is needed for 
training purposes. This is compensated for by a percentage 
factor to satisfy this requirement. 
b. Maintenance 
A number of extra aircraft is needed to allow for 
planes in maintenance status. This is the "pipeline" demand, 
and it is also compensated for by a percentage factor. 
c. R&D Units 
Additional aircraft acquired to support R&D (not 
the R&D expense itself) are added to the number of planes 
needed due to training and pipeline factors. 
4. Marine Corps 
The estimated capital stock value of Marine Corps 
amphibious assault equipment is provided in Appendix E. The 
force structure presented closely resembles the two MEBs that 
were assembled off Kuwait in February 1991. The capital stock 
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value of this force does not include Marine Corps aircraft 
since they are included in the APN account, and are a part of 
the air component analyzed in Appendix D. In addition, 
calculations included the estimated cost of the 35 tanks, 100 
Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs), 150 Light Armored Vehicles 
(LAVs), 17 Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCACs) and 13 Landing 
Craft Utility (LCUs) that were available to afloat Marine 
Corps forces in the Gulf. (Cheney, 1992, p. 297) The capital 
stock value of ordnance carried by Marine Corps forces is 
estimated along with Navy ordnance in Appendix G. 
s. space Assets 
Appendix F provides an estimate of the capital stock 
value of the space assets that were notionally available to 
u.s. theater commanders during the Gulf War. In developing 
cost estimates, it was assumed that the largest share of 
satellite capital cost is attributable to R&D and procurement. 
Additionally, overall capital value is assumed to have the 
following relative weights: 25 percent for ground control, 25 
percent for user control, 3 0 percent for the cost of the 
satellite, and 20 percent for boosters. (SIS, 1993, p. 38), 
(Wolfert, 1994) Unclassified sources were consul ted to arrive 
at an estimation of individual satellite costs. This data is 
presented in four columns representing the relative weights, 
and a summation of costs in the right hand column. The total 
cost summarized at the bottom is not intended to represent the 
capital value of all space assets in orbit, but only those 
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that may have been directly associated with MRSC-DS in 
prosecuting the Persian Gulf War. 
6. Weapons and Ordnance 
Appendix G provides an unclassified estimate of the 
capital stock value of major ordnance stocks on Navy 
combatants and Marine Corps amphibious forces deployed during 
Desert Storm. Since MRSC-DS is assumed to be self-sufficient 
for approximately one week, capital stock value of ordnance on 
resupply ships was not estimated. 
7. Summary 
Table 6 is a summary of capital services values for 
various "force elements", or sections, which make up MRSC-DS. 
Force elements consist of: aircraft carriers, Navy tactical 
aircraft (F-14, F-18, and A-6), Navy support aircraft (S-3, E-
2, EA-6B, SH-2/60, SH-3), surface combatants and submarines 
(which include minesweepers), amphibious ships, support and 
auxiliary ships, two MEBs without Marine Corps aircraft, 
Marine Corps logistics (CH-46 and CH-53) and tactical aircraft 
(AH-1, UH-1, AV-8B, OH-58), weapons and ordnance, and space 
assets. Definition of force elements is useful in deter-
mining ratios of operations and support costs to capital 
services value for MRSC-DS, and provides an opportunity to 
compare and contrast MRSC-DS with MRSC-2015 in Chapter V. 
Several different service lives are used in determining 
capital services value. All ships, with the exception of 
aircraft carriers, are assigned a service life of 30 years. 
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Aircraft carriers are assumed to have a 45 year service life 
thanks to the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). Planes 
and vehicles, including Marine Corps equipment, have a 20 
year service life. Finally, weapons and ordnance have a 15 
year service life, while satellites service life is 10 years. 
{DOC, 1993, p. M-17) 
TABLE 6. CAPITAL SERVICES VALUE (MRSC-OS) 
Aircraft Carriers 284,351 
Navy Tactical Aircraft 1,058,200 
Navy Support Aircraft 409,100 
Surface Combatants and 990,134 
Subs 
Amphibious Ships 341,893 
Support and Auxiliary 409,364 
Ships 
2 MEBs W/0 USMC Aircraft 66,450 
USMC Log. Aircraft 159,250 
USMC Tac. Aircraft 124,700 
Weapons/Ordnance 362,567 
MRSC-DS (W/0 Space) 4,206,009 
Space Assets 2,410,000 
MRS C-DS (with Space) 6,616,009 
Note: Costs in thousands of FY1990 dollars. 
As can be seen for MRSC-DS, when comparing the capital 
services value of Table 6 with the capital stock value of 
Appendices c through G, to maintain a relatively large 
inventory of military assets requires a modest annual invest-
ment. For instance, the capital stock value of MRSC-DS 
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aircraft carriers is $12.795 billion, while the capital 
services value is only $284 million. 3 The large difference 
in these two values is the result of a 45 year aircraft 
carrier service life. The $284 million represents the annual 
investment needed in procurement (i.e., SCN) for replacements 
to maintain this inventory. It does not include any opera-
tions and support costs, which are discussed in the next 
section. 
Navy tactical aircraft have a capital stock value of 
$21.164 billion. However, when considering a 20 year service 
life of aircraft, the capital services value is only $1.058 
billion per year. Again, this would represent the annual 
investment (i.e., APN) needed for replacements to maintain 
this inventory. It is interesting to compare the capital 
services values of aircraft carriers with Navy tactical and 
support aircraft. Navy tactical and support aircraft 
replacement costs are five times that of carrier replacement 
costs on a yearly basis! 
Another interesting comparison is that of aircraft 
carriers to space assets. The capital stock value of aircraft 
carriers is approximately 1/2 that of space. However, due to 
the large difference in service lives (45 years for carriers 
versus 10 years for space assets), the capital services value 
of the aircraft carriers is approximately 1/8 th the capital 
3The capital stock value of aircraft carriers includes 
the value of major upgrades, including the Service Life 
Extension Program (SLEP) . (NAVSEA, 1994, encl. 1) 
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services value of the space assets. It is apparent that the 
cost of an individual carrier must be kept in perspective. 
Because their service life is so long, the annual capital 
services value is moderately low. 
D. OPERATING AND SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS 
O&S can be considered the price needed during peacetime to 
maintain the readiness of U.S. forces to fight a war. It 
includes costs such as salaries of personnel, fuel, mainten-
ance, and other recurring expenses. The next step is to 
discuss O&S costs for MRSC-DS using the Quick Cost Model. 
1. Quick Cost Podel 
The Quick Cost Model takes as inputs changes in 
Primary Defense Forces (e.g., numbers of ships or airplanes 
etc.) and provides costs in terms of Budget Authority (BA) or 
Total Obligation Authority (TOA), and end strength resources . 
(Vassar, 1989, p. 3) This model is quite similar to the 
Defense Resources Model used by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) in that it utilizes an unclassified file obtained 
from DOD generated from the budget year data of the Future 
Years Defense Program (FYDP) . Various Program Elements (PEs) 
are broadly grouped into Aggregate Elements (AEs) , and 
Resource Identification Categories (RICs) into Resource 
Identifiers (Ris) to a level suitable for declassification. 
This processed is referred to as a "roll-up." (Vassar, 1989, 
p. 3) 
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a. Aggregate Elements (AEs) 
AEs are broken down into primary AEs, which are 
directly related to changes in force structure; related AEs, 
which are proportional to certain resource changes of the 
primary AEs; auxiliary AEs, which are proportional to changes 
in certain resources of all primary and related AEs; and other 
AEs. All are listed in Appendix A. For the purposes of this 
paper, AEs are grouped in three categories: primary, related, 
and support (with support consisting of auxiliary and other 
AEs). 
This model relies on a hierarchal structure, in 
which changes in one category depend on changes to resources 
in higher level categories (e.g., support AEs are dependent on 
both related AEs and primary AEs). (Vassar, 1989, p. 8) The 
resources or "proxies" which directly influence changes in a 
particular AE are divided into seven categories. Basically, 
how a AE changes is a function of what allocation variable(s) 
or 11 proxies" effect it. How the proxies change is based on a 
change in the force structure, which is the input to the 
model. A point of note is that the proxy resources appear at 
the top of the left hand side table in Appendix A, and the 
higher categories over which they are summed appear in the 
middle table. A related AE does not support all primary AEs, 
but instead only certain ones to which it is "linked. 11 
(Vassar, 1989, p. 9) 
55 
b. Fixed-Variable Percent 
When resource levels for a certain AE are changed, 
there is a factor known as the 11 fixedjvariable percent." This 
factor represents the percentage by which an AE would decrease 
if the resources of the higher category in the hierarchal 
structure were removed. For the primary AEs it is assumed to 
be 100 percent. For instance, if there were no platforms in 
the model, there would be no primary AE resources needed. The 
related AEs are typically between 80 and 100 percent variable, 
and support AEs from 0 percent to an appropriate value. 
(Vassar, 1989, p. 10) The fixed-variable percent factors are 
derived from an historical estimate of how force structure 
changes have effected O&S costs in the post-World War II era. 
For the purposes of MRSC-DS, this relationship will hold true. 
However, some adjustments to the fixed-variable percent 
relationships need to be developed when the cost of MRSC-2015 
is calculated. This is discussed in the next chapter. 
c. Internal Factors 
Each AE has 13 internal factors which are listed 
in Appendix B. Each internal factor is a linear combination 
of at least one RI, and as many as seven. The complete 
internal factor for one combination of resources (i.e., one of 
the 13 internal factors) for a specific AE is as follows; 
56 
Primary AE: 
Linear Combination of Ris 
Numbers of Forces 
Related AE: 
Linear Combination o£ Ris 
Proxy resources summed using all linked primary AEs 
Support AE: 
Linear Combination of Ris 
Proxy resources summed using AEs of higher categories 
For example, Internal Factor 10 (Primary AE) for Military 
Construction is: 
Internal Factor 10 (Primary AE) = 44 10 (MCN) + 4450 (MCNR) 
Numbers of forces of the str 
The significance of internal factors is that they 
are part of the Force Cost Equation for primary, related, and 
support AEs. The formula for a change in the cost of a 
particular AE is listed below: 
Primary AE: 
(Change in Force Level) x (Internal Factor) x (FixedjVar. %) 
Related AE: 
(Change in Proxy Resource summed over all Primary AEs to 
which it is linked) x (Internal Factor) x (Fixed/Variable %) 
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Support AE: 
(Changes in Proxy Resources summed over AEs in higher 
categories) x (Internal Factors) x (Fixed/Variable %) 
As discussed before, the hierarchal order of the 
model results in primary AEs being calculated first, followed 
by related AEs, and then support AEs. To obtain a change in 
total O&S costs due to a change in force structure, the 
primary, related and support AEs computed for the new force 
structure are summed together. 
2. cost Presentation 
The major focus of this analysis is to present the 
ratios of O&S costs to capital services value (Table 6) for a 
force structure. Below is a "macro" view of the relationship 
that is developed: 
Operating + Support Costs 
Capital Services Value 
O&S costs are broken down into the three basic AEs 
discussed earlier: primary, related and support. These costs 
can be broadly defined as the cost of supporting forces during 
peacetime, and can be considered a major factor in maintaining 
military readiness. The primary AEs for a platform (e.g., 
ship or plane) consist of that portion of manning (MPN, RPN, 
MPMC, RPMC), and operating (O&M, N, O&M, MC, APN andjor OPN) 
required for direct support (e.g., to operate a ship 
underway) . The APN contribution is not for individual 
aircraft procurement, but for direct support items which are 
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funded in the APN account. The related AEs for a platform 
include the accounts listed above (MPN, RPN, MPMC, RPMC, O&M, 
N, O&M, MC, APN and/or OPN), but pertain to indirect rather 
than direct supporting roles (e.g., command and control). The 
support AEs include the accounts listed above, and also the 
remainder of the appropriations accounts (e.g., MCON, MCNR, 
FH, N&MC, etc.) that are needed to house dependents, build and 
operate refit facilities, etc. Investment, RDT&E, N, National 
Intelligence and Communications are not estimated by this 
model. For the purpose of this analysis, the National Defense 
Sealift Fund (NDSF) and the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BR&C) accounts are excluded. Referring to Table 7, a summary 
of the Quick Cost results is provided. On the left hand 
margin are force elements of MRSC-DS. Space assets, which are 
a part of MRSC-DS, are included separately since their O&S 
costs were not calculated using the Quick Cost Model. Listed 
across the top of Table 7 is a breakdown of primary 1 related, 
and support AEs, as well as a total. 
3. Development of Ratios 
In analyzing this data, several ratios need to be 
developed so MRSC-DS can be compared with MRSC-2015. A 
tabular presentation of ratios is provided in Table 8. On the 
left hand margin of Table 8 are the various components or 
force elements of the overall MRSC as presented in Appendices 
C through G. The capital services values of these force ele-
ments were presented in Table 6, and the O&S costs in Table 7. 
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TABLE 7. O&S COSTS (MRSC-DS) 
Element Primary AE Related AE Support AE Total AEs 
Carriers 933,395 75,763 541,089 1,550,247 
Navy 495,654 25,747 408,245 929,646 
TacAir 
Navy 397,107 78,975 385,725 861,807 
Support 
Air 
Surface 1,150,978 296,391 454,154 1,901,523 
& 
Subs 
Amphibia 711,114 66,897 340,302 1,118,313 
us 
Ships 




2 MEBs 407,125 207,604 298,188 912,917 
wjo USMC 
air 
USMC 107,218 51,941 52,621 211,780 
Log. Air 
USMC 146,847 46,019 44,482 237,348 
TacAir 
-











Note: Space asset O&S costs are not included in the Quick Cost 
Model and are estimated to be 10 percent of space 
capital stock value. (SIS, 1993, p. 38), (Wolfert, 
1994) All costs in thousands of FY90 dollars. 
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Along the top of Table 8 are two ratios that relate 
O&S costs to capital services values, and a third ratio that 
relates capital services value to total capital services 
value. The first item is the ratio of the O&S cost of a 
particular force element to its capital services value 
(CapSvcVal) . The second item is the ratio of the O&S cost of 
a particular force element to the total capital services value 
(TCSV) of the overall MRSC. The third item is the ratio of 
the capital service value (CapSvcVal) of a particular force 
element to the total capital services value (TCSV) of the 
overall MRSC. 
The purpose of these ratios is to gain an appreciation 
of how the ratios of MRSC-DS might change with MRSC-2015, and 
as a result, how that might influence an investment strategy 
of the future. This is discussed further in Chapter V. 
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TABLE 8. O&S TO CAPITAL VALUE RATIOS (MRSC-DS) 
Element 0&5/Cap5vcVal 0&5/TC5V CapSvcVal/TCSV 
Aircraft 5.452 .370 .068 
Carriers 
Navy .878 .222 .253 
TacAir 
Navy 2.107 .206 .098 
SupAir 
Surface & 1. 921 .454 .236 
Subs 
Amphib 3.271 .267 .082 
Ships 
Support & 3.735 .365 .098 
Aux. Ships 
2 MEBs W/0 13.738 .218 .016 
USMC air 
USMC Log. 1.330 .051 .038 
air 
USMC 1.903 .057 .030 
TacAir 
Space 1.000 .364 .364 
Assets 
* 
Weapons & ------ ------ .083 
Ordnance 
Note: Capital services value to total capital services value 
ratio may not add to 1.00 due to rounding. *Indicates 
numbers are an approximation only. (Recall that for 
space assets, O&S is considered to be 10 percent of 
capital stock value, and capital services value is 
equivalent to capital stock value divided by a service 
life of 10 years. Thus, the O&S to CapSvcVal ratio is 
approximated at 1.00). 
In the next chapter, the force structure of MRSC-2015 





The cost calculation of MRSC-2015 follows the same 
approach used in Chapter III for MRSC-DS. First, an estimated 
force structure is presented. Next, the capital services 
values and O&S costs are estimated. Finally, ratios are 
developed so as to facilitate further analysis and comparison 
of MRSC-2015 with MRSC-DS in Chapter V. 
B. FORCE STRUCTURE 
MRSC-2015 looks somewhat similar to MRSC-DS. With 
technological change however, comes a change in the size and 
composition of the force structure. Discussed below are some 
of the probable changes in the composition and size of MRSC-
2015. 
The MRSC of 2015 is somewhat smaller in numbers, using 
four NETFs, consisting of four aircraft carriers, and one MEB. 
Aircraft carriers are all nuclear powered, with four vice six 
carriers sufficient to conduct near-continuous air operations 
in a regional conflict. One MEB is available for a precision 
strike or a flanking assault vice the "opposed landing" 
scenario planned for in Desert Storm of 1991. (Hall, 1992, p. 
7) Recall from Chapter II, that an MRSC is designed to 
operate for approximately one week without reinforcements. As 
a result, additional Marine forces would be expected to 
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rapidly deploy to the theater of operations. The one MEB 
initially employed in MRSC-2015 does not suggest any reduction 
in the overall size of the Marine Corps from MRSC-DS, but 
rather an afloat amphibious force tailored for a particular 
mission. 
1. Aircraft 
Manned aircraft still take off from carriers, although 
the "force package" wing contains 50 rather than the 
traditional 60 fighter and attack aircraft in the MRSC-DS 
carrier air wing. (O'Rourke, 1993, p. CRS-18) The Navy 
maintains the deep-strike role for its tactical aircraft, 
having a fully-operational stealth attack plane before 2015. 
A navalized version of the F-117A Stealth aircraft assumes 
this role, and, along with the F/A-18 E/F (which enters the 
fleet in 2001), is the striking arm of the carriers. 
(Marrocco, 1993, p. 96) The F-14 Tomcat is retired from the 
fleet by this time, while supporting airframes (such as E-2s, 
S-3s, etc.) remain in service and are fewer in number 
proportional to the reduction in the number of MRSC aircraft 
carriers. 
2. Submarines 
The submarine component of MRSC-2015 consists of Ohio-
class submarines (capable of launching conventional-warhead 
Trident ballistic missiles), the Seawolf (or New Attack 
Submarine), and improved Los Angeles-class submarines. The 
Seawolf and Los Angeles-class submarines are capable of firing 
64 
Tomahawk cruise missiles and MK 48 ADCAP torpedoes, 
neutralizing minefields, as well as inserting and extracting 
special operations forces (SOF) ashore. 
3. Surface Combatants 
Surface combatants include new 21st century strike 
destroyers with increased Vertical Launch System (VLS) 
capacity for missiles, Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and Burke-
class destroyers. A Minesweeper Command Ship with he! icopters 
and accompanying minesweepers should round out the surface 
force. Other classes of cruisers, destroyers, and guided 
missile frigates are retired by 2015. This change in the 
surface force reflects the change in emphasis on inland 
strikes and provision it for theater ballistic missile 
defense. 
4. Amphibious Forces 
Amphibious forces are reduced by approximately one-
half when compared with MRSC-DS, reflecting the requirement to 
support only one MEB for precision strike in MRSC-2015. A new 
amphibious ship, the LX, is added to replace older amphibious 
ships. Additional amphibious force readiness is achieved with 
a new medium-lift capable aircraft, designated the V-22, 
(replacing the CH-46), and an increase in the number of 
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCACs). 
s. Logistics and support Ships 
The numbers of logistics and support ships should show 
a decline with the reduction in the size of the overall force. 
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However, some additions are made. Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships 
(ADC-Xs} and three minesweeper transport ships (dubbed "MX"), 
are added to provide improved logistics and open-ocean ''piggy-
back" transit to the minesweepers, respectively. (Kelso, 
1993, p. 46) (CB02, 1993, p. 5) 
Table 9 shows MRSC-2015 ships; Table 10, the afloat 
amphibious forces; and Table 11, the air assets. 
TABLE 9. MRSC-2015 SHIPS 
Carriers (CVN) . . . • • . • • • 
Submarines . . . . . . . 
Surface Combatants . • . . . . • . . • • . . 
Large Amphibious' Ships • • . . . • . . . • • • . • • • 
Other Amphibious Ships . . • • • • • • . • • 
Mine Countermeasure Ships . . • . . . • . • • . • • • 
Combat Support/Replenishment Ships • . . . • • . 
Other Combat Logistic Ships . . . . • . 











Note: Information for Table 9 taken from Ships for Peacetime, 
Crises and Regional Conflicts (CRM-92-112) . (Alexandria 
VA. Center for Naval Analyses. September 1992), and 
author's estimate. 
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TABLE 10. MRSC-2015 AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AFLOAT 
HQ command Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 
Combat Service Support Element . . . 
Infantry Battalions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Light Armored Infantry Companies . . . . . . . 
Tank Companies . . • . . • . . . . • . . . . . 
Assault Amphibian Companies . . . . . . 
Recon Companies • . . . . . . . . . • . . . 
Combat Engineer Companies . . . . . . . . . . . 
Anti-Tank Platoon . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . 
Truck company Det . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 












8 ,500 Marines 
TABLE 11. MRSC-2015 AIR ASSETS 
Air-Fixed Wing Afloat 
F-117N . . . . . . . . . . . 56 (USN) 
F-18 Hornet . . . . . . . 144 (USN) 
AV-8B Harrier . . . . . . . . 28 (USMC) 
S-3 Viking . . . 28 (USN) 
E-2 Hawkeye . . . . . . . . . 20 (USN) 
EA-68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 (USN) 
Air-Rotary Wing Afloat 
AH-1 Cobra . . . . . . . . 17 (USMC) 
UH-1 Huey . . . . . . . . 17 (USMC) 
V-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 (13 USN, 32 USMC) 
CH-53 Sea Stallion . . . . . 52 (USMC) 
SH-2/SH-60 . . . . . . . . . 24 (USN) 
SH-3 . . . . . . . . . . 24 (USN) 
OH-58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 (USMC) 
Note: Information for Tables 10 and 11 taken from "Navy 
Carrier-Based Fighter and Attack Aircraft: Moderniza-
tion Options for Congress." (Washington, D.C. 
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Congress . 1 
October 1993), "Integrated Amphibious Operations & USMC 
Air Requirements Study." (Washington, D. c., Department 
of the Navy. 26 September 1993 ) , and author's estimate. 
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6. Weapons and Ordnance 
The most noticeable change occurs is the types of 
weapons and ordnance MRSC-2015 employs. Reflecting the need 
to strike inland and provide for theater ballistic missile 
defense (TBMD), several innovative systems, discussed below, 
are fully operational. 
a. surface-to-surface Weapons 
A limited number of Trident missiles carried on 
Ohio-class submarines are armed with conventional warheads, 
capable of destroying deep underground targets, such as 
command centers. The Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program 
(TBIP) has developed a submarine and surface-launched Tomahawk 
land attack cruise missile that uses real-time Global 
Positioning System (GPS) updates, and is capable of discrim-
inating between wider target sets. Targeting includes a "man-
in-the-loop" capability that makes this weapon more effective 
against critical mobile targets (CMTs). (Kelso, 1993, p. 30) 
A navalized version of the extended range, all-
weather, day-or-night Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs) is 
employed on surface combatants and newer amphibious ships for 
deep inland strike. The weapon is capable of destroying tanks 
and armored vehicles that are beyond the range of artillery or 
rockets. (Ke lso, 1993, p. 30) 
An extended range, advanced lightweight gun, 
capable of firing precision guided munitions (PGMs), guided by 
GPS, and with ranges over 70 nautical miles, is employed. It 
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replaced some of the 5 inch guns on Ticonderoga-class cruisers 
and Burke-class destroyers. It also arms the 21st century 
Strike destroyer, and provides more effective and useful Naval 
Gunfire Support to forces ashore. (CB02, 1993, p. 11) 
b. Surface-to-Air Weapons 
Strike destroyers provide the capability for an 
endo-atmospheric TBMD "umbrella, 11 using the upgraded Standard 
Missile 2 Block IVA. (Kelso, 1993, p. 76, Soofer, 1994, p. 
64, Bush, 1994, p. 40) Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Burke-
class destroyers continue to rely on the Aegis weapon system 
for defense against the air threat. However, VLS capacity is 
somewhat more evenly distributed between land attack and air 
defense weapons than was the case with the destroyers and 
cruisers in the MRSC-DS. (Rubright, 1992) An improved 
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and a new laser weapon, 
designated "HELLWEPS," are available to defend against low-
flying cruise missiles and close-aboard air attacks. (CB02, 
1993, pp. 16-17, Atwal, 1993, p. 19) The laser weapon 
replaces the traditional 5 inch gun mounts that were not 
converted to fire PGMs. 
c. Air-to-Surface Weapons 
Following its successful employment in MRSC-DS, 
the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) is improved and 
remains in service after the introduction of the Tri-Service 
Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) . These weapons provide a 
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Standoff Outside Area Defense (SOAD) capability for attack 
aircraft. (Kelso 1 1993 1 p. 30) 
The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) is 
employed as a replacement to the MK-80 series bombs as a low 
cost, all-weather, precision-guided weapon. The Joint 
Standoff Weapon is the single replacement for numerous 
Standoff Outside Point Defense (SOPD) weapons in MRSC-DS 
inventory. (Kelso, 1993, p. 31) 
d. Air-to-Air Weapons 
The Advanced Medium Range Air-to Air Missile 
(AMRAAM) replaces the Sparrow, having improved capabilities 
against both low and high-altitude targets. (Kelso, 1993, p. 
46) 
e. UAVs/RPVs 
One other noticeable change in the weapons load-
out for MRSC-2015 is a much more versatile and capable 
inventory of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles {UAVs) and Remotely 
Piloted Vehicles {RPVs). Three different types exist: a 
Short Range UAV, a Close Range UAV for use by ground troops, 
and a Vertical Take-Off UAV stationed onboard large-deck 
ships (Lesser, 1993, pp. 36-44). The weapons and ordnance 
of MRSC-2015 are tabulated in Table 12. 
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TABLE 12. WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE (MRSC-2015) 
Type CVNs CGs DOGs DDGXs SSBNs SSNs AMPB TOTAL 
TROT 
---- ---- ---- --- 12 --- ---- 12 
TBIP 
----
272 64 ---- -- 122 ---· 458 
SLAM 200 --- --- --- --- - - - 200 
ATCM --- 238 150 50 ---- -- 56 496 
TSSM 150 -- -- - - -- ---- 150 
HELF --- -- ---- ---- --- - 2000 2000 
TOW --- -- -- -- ---- -- 2000 2000 
HARM 1000 --- ---- ---- --- ---- - - 1000 
JSOW 240 ---- ---- ---- -- --- -- 240 
STDM ---- 380 378 ---- --- ---- --- 758 
TBMD ---- ---- ---- 488 --- --- ---- 488 
SWDR 1000 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 200 1200 
AMRM 800 ---- ---- ---- --- ---- ---- 800 
JDAM 10 K --- --- ---- -- --- 2000 12 K 
RAM 192 ---- --- 192 --- --- 672 1446 
HELW ---- 2000 390 ---- ---- ---- -- 2390 
MK50 --- 60 48 24 -- --- ---- 132 
MK48 ........... ---- ---- --- 20 180 --- 200 
AVGN ---- 3000 2400 
--- --- ---- ----
5400 
ASRC 
---- 160 128 ---- --- -- - 288 
TALD 240 ---- --- ---- ---- ---- ---- 240 
SRUV 30 
CRUV ---- --- ----- ---- --- ---- 48 48 
VTOL 24 
Note: Information f or Table 12 taken f rom "Na vy Ship Weapons 
Load Dat a base 11 (Washington, D.C., CBO 10 Feb 94), 
"Selected Options f or Enhancing Naval Capability in 
Regional Conflicts 11 (Washington, D. C. , CBO , June 199 3) 
11 Information Warfare Brief 11 (Washington, D.C. , NDU, 7 
Dec 92) , "Naval Anti-Miss i le Laser Readied for Sea. 11 
7 1 
Defense Electronics (April 1993), "Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles-Still a Tbp DOD Priority." Defense Electronics 
(March 1993) and author's estimate. 
7. Space 
MRSC-2015 displays a significant capability from space 
in supporting power projection from the sea and onto land. 
Platforms such as AWACS, JSTARS, and more capable satellites,_ 
give MRSC-2015 a highly integrated organization of assets that 
create an "information fusion hierarchy" of data, thus 
maximizing its potential use for combat. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 
16) Real-time mission updates, with pin-point localization 
information, greatly enhance the effectiveness of tactical 
air, land, and sea operations. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 17) 
C. MILITARY CAPITAL 
As discussed in Chapter III, present and future R&D costs 
need to be accounted for when attempting to predict the 
capital services value of MRSC-2015. The vast majority of 
this force structure includes platforms already developed for 
MRSC-DS. As a result, the difference in capital services 
value between MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015 is only modestly affected 
by two factors: first, a change in the number of existing 
assets in the capital stock inventory between MRS C-DS and 
MRSC-2015, and secondly, the addition of new assets developed 
and acquired to replenish capital stock inventory for MRSC-
2015. 
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1. Changes in Existing Capital Stock 
Assuming that service lives remain constant, assets no 
longer maintained in the inventory result in a reduction in 
the capital services value for a future force (with everything 
else held constant) . A smaller number of assets cause a 
reduction in the capital stock (inventory) value. 
2. New capital stock 
New capital stock developed and acquired for MRSC-2015 
includes ships, submarines, planes, weapons and space assets. 
Two major costs are associated with new capital stock: R&D, 
and procurement. The difference in the value of capital stock 
from MRSC-DS to MRSC-2015 is due to the change in force 
structure, as well as modernization efforts. Force structure 
changes due to inventory changes result from the procurement 
of new military assets as well as the retirement of assets 
which have reached the end of their service life. Moderniza-
tion of existing forces comes about by replacement of existing 
forces with improved assets and through expenditures of R&D. 
Thus, both procurement and R&D affect the new value of capital 
stock. Presently, R&D costs continue to increase as compared 
to procurement costs. For FY 1993, a 1. 5:1 ratio between 
procurement and R&D existed for all defense programs. 
(Carlisle, 1992 1 p. 309) over the past 30 years, the ratio 
averaged 2.5:1, and if present trends continue (with only a 2 
percent increase in R&D per year as planned) , the ratio will 
fall to 1:1 by the year 2000. (Carlisle, 1992, p. 309) 
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As a result, for the purposes of this study, new 
capital stock value of aircraft, ships, weapons and space 
assets developed after the year 2000 for MRSC-2015 is assumed 
to be approximately 50 percent R&D costs and 50 percent 
procurement cost. For some new platforms already under 
development (such as the LX), or for which there is already a 
similar airframe in service (such as the V-22, F/A-18 E/F, and 
F-117N), the procurement to R&D ratio "stabilizes" at the FY 
1993 level of 1.5:1. 
Presented in Appendices H through K are the capital 
stock values of the ships, aircraft, amphibious forces, and 
weapons for MRSC-2015. R&D costs of new platforms are added 
to the capital stock value of existing platforms and assets in 
the Appendices to determine the new capital stock value for 
MRSC-2015. 
3. Capital Services Value 
Provided for in Table 13 is a summary of the capital 
services value for each of the force elements of MRSC-2015. 
The service life estimates utilized for the MRSC-DS were also 
applied in calculating the capital services value for MRSC-
2015. (The capital services value for space assets in the 
MRSC of 2015 is a rough approximation only of capital stock 
replacement costs divided by a service life of 10 years using 
current information, and should only be considered in very 
broad terms). (Wolfert, 1993, p. 23, DOC, 1993, p. M-17) 
74 
TABLE 13. CAPITAL SERVICES VALUES (MRSC- 2015) 
Aircraft carriers 325,914 
Navy Tactical Aircraft 1,426,300 
Navy Support Aircraft 398,650 
surface Combatants and Subs 1,271,967 
Amphibious Ships 405,757 
Support and Auxiliary Ships 268,101 
1 MEB W/0 USMC Aircraft 51,925 
USMC Logistics Aircraft 197,150 
USMC Tactical Aircraft 92 ; 200 
Weapons (Ordnance) 992,685 
MRSC (W/0 Space) 5,430,649 
Space 10,000,000 
MRSC (with Space) 15,430,649 
Note: All costs in thousands o f FY 1990 dollars. 
It may be helpful to review the capital services value 
concept. As shown in Appendix H, the capital stock value of 
MRSC-2015 aircraft carriers is $14.666 billion, while Table 13 
indicates that the capital services value is only $325 
million. The large difference in these two value is the 
result of a 45 year aircraft carrier service life. The $325 
million represents the annual investment needed in procurement 
(i.e., SCN) for replacements to maintain this inventory. It 
does not include any operations and support costs. 
As .shown in Appendix I, Navy tactical aircraft have a 
capital stock value of $28.520 billion. However, when 
considering a 20 year service l i fe of aircraft, the capital 
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services value is only $1.426 billion. Again, this would 
represent the annual investment (i.e., APN & RDT&E, N) needed 
for replacements to maintain this inventory. It is 
interesting to note when comparing the capital services values 
of aircraft carriers with Navy tactical and support aircraft. 
Aircraft replacement costs are approximately six times greater 
than carrier replacement costs on a yearly basis! 
Another interesting note is a comparison of aircraft 
carriers to space. The capital stock value of aircraft 
carriers is approximately 1/7th that of space. However, due 
to the large difference in service lives ( 45 years for 
carriers versus 10 years for space) , the capital services 
value is approximately 1/30th the cost! 
D. O&S COSTS 
In determining the O&S costs of MRSC-2015, the Quick Cost 
Model is used again. With the continued downsizing of forces 
since the end of the Cold War, significant changes in the 
defense infrastructure occur. As a result, a closer 
examination of the suitability of the Quick Cost Model is 
appropriate. 
1. Fixed-Variable Percent 
When the historical fixed-versus-variable factors in 
the Quick Cost Model are examined (the historical percentage 
by which a related and/or support AE changes if resources of 
a higher category in the hierarchy changes), it becomes 
obvious that they were based on the experience of the Cold War 
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force structure. These factors, based on historical data, 
were designed to accommodate relatively small fluctuations in 
an already large and relatively stable force structure. This 
approach cannot be used with the significantly downsized force 
that started with the Base Force concept and continues with 
The Bottom Up Review. Accordingly, modification of these 
factors by utilizing more recent data than that historical 
data base is appropriate. 
Discussions with CBO indicate that the Quick Cost 
Model predictions closely follow post-Cold War budget expendi-
tures when support AEs maintain a 50 percent fixed versus 
variable cost relationship in the aggregate. (Myers, 1994) 
This is a heavier weighting of the variable component as 
compared to the historical data base, and is an appropriate 
response of the cost relationship as more fixed cost infra-
structure is eliminated in the drawdown. An assumption is 
made that this relationship holds true after the drawdown is 
complete for MRSC-2015. As a result, these adjustments are 
made in predicting O&S costs for MRSC-2015, which appear in 
Table 14. 
2. Development of Ratios 
Table 15 presents ratios of capital services values 
and O&S costs to provide for further analysis. In Table 15, 
force elements are listed on the left hand margin. Along the 
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TABLE 14. O&S COSTS (MRSC-2015) 
Force Element Primary AE Related AE Support AE Total 
Carriers 496,062 54,566 346,407 
Navy 555,481 47,848 435,118 
Tacair 
Navy 380,544 74,531 369,644 
SupAir 
Surface & 914,987 189,615 300,563 
Subs 
Amphibious 334,642 31,481 193,083 
Ships 
Support & 415,295 362,885 261,550 
Aux. Ships 
1 MEB wjo 203,563 103,802 149,094 
USMC air 
USMC Log. 130,132 61 '114 62,165 
Air 
USMC 122,919 39,982 39,402 
TacAir 
MRSC (w jo Space) 3,553,625 965,824 2,157,026 
Space -------- ---------- ---------
MRSC (with Space) --------- ---------- ---------
Note: Space O&S costs are not included in Quick 
are assumed to be 10 percent of Space 
value. (SIS, 1993, p. 38, Wolfert, 1994) 













Cost Model and 
capital stock 
All costs in 
top are ratios of O&S costs to capital services value 
(CapSvVal), O&S costs to total capital services value 
(TCapSvVal), and capital services value to total capital 
service value, respectively. 
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TABLE 15. O&S TO CAPITAL SERVICES VALUE RATIOS (MRSC-2015) 
Element O&S/Capsvval O&S/TCapsvVal capsvval/ 
TCapsvval 
Aircraft 2.752 .056 .020 
Carriers 
Navy .692 .065 .094 
Tacair 
Navy 1. 945 .051 .026 
supAir 
Surface & 1. 092 .088 .079 
Subs 
Amphibious 1. 251 . 035 .025 
Ships 
Support & 4.476 .065 .017 
Aux. Ships 
1 MEB W/0 .440 .028 .003 
USMC air 
USMC Log. l. 225 .016 .013 
air 
USMC 2.085 .012 .006 
TacAir 
Space * 1.000 .624 .624 
Weapons & ----- ----- .093 
Ordnance 
Note: Capital Services Value to Total Capital Services Value 
may not add to 1.00 due to rounding. 
* Indicates numbers are an approximation only. 
In the next chapter, a comparison is made of O&S costs 
and capital services values for MRSC-DS vs. MRSC-2015. 
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V. MRSC-08 vs. MRSC-2015 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last two chapters outlined the estimated character-
istics and cost of MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015. Each MRSC was 
broken down into force elements (e.g., Navy Tactical 
Aircraft) , so that a useful set of ratios of capital services 
values and O&S costs could be developed. In addition, by 
summing up each of the respective force elements, overall O&S 
costs and capital services values for each MRSC were 
determined. This chapter is an in-depth comparison of MRSC-DS 
and MRSC-2015. 
First, the O&S cost (specifically the fixed-to-variable 
cost relationships in the support AEs) of two MRSCs is 
analyzed and discussed. An effort is made to predict an 
overall O&S cost curve with regard to force structure that 
accurately reflects the dramatic drawdown that is currently 
underway in the Navy and defense establishment. 
Secondly, the individual force elements of each MRSC are 
examined to determine their O&S costs and capital services 
values relative to the total cost of the MRSC. This is done 
in two sections: the MRSC without the space force ele ment 
(Figures L-2A through L-7A), and the MRSC including space 
(Figure L-8). A distinction is made since the space force 
element capital services value and O&S costs are considered to 
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be only broad estimates, and as a result, do not contain the 
same accuracy as other data. By determining and adding 
together the capital services values and O&S costs, a yearly 
total cost is determined to support each MRSC. 
Third, the costs associated with fielding two MRSC-2015s 
are examined. This analysis includes the concepts of force 
availability and economies of scale, in the event of two near-
simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies as envisioned in the 
BUR. In addition, opportunity cost associated with designing 
the foundation of MRSC-2015 using four aircraft carriers is 
presented and analyzed. This opportunity cost is 
"benchmarked" to the cost of four aircraft carriers. 
Finally, the concept of a "tooth-to-tail" ratio is 
introduced and analyzed. This concept is a way of comparing 
the cost of the MRSC's "precision strike power" (tooth) with 
that of the necessary support required to maintain the MRSC 
(tail). This can be a useful measure to determine if the 
investment strategy of the Navy and DOD in supporting the 
concept of a MRSC can effectively promote power projection 
"from the sea" with the force of the future. 
B. FIXED-VARIABLE COST RELATIONSHIP 
In determining the O&S costs of the two MRSCs, three 
general categories consisting of primary, related, and support 
AEs were introduced in Chapters III and IV. In MRSC-DS, 
historical cost relationships were used as input in 
determining each category's costs. 
81 
This historically large 
and relatively stable Cold War defense establishment is in the 
process of a dramatic downsizing. As infrastructure and 
fac: -ties fixtures are being closed down, the cost of MRSC-
2015 is distributed differently. As a result, an update to 
the Quick Cost Model is being developed in an attempt to 
capture the effect of this infrastructure reduction on total 
O&S costs. (Myers, 1994) 
Over the past four years (FY1990-93), DOD has experienced 
an approximately 25 percent force reduction under Secretary of 
Defense Cheney's "Base Force" concept. Actual budget 
expenditures associated with this downsizing have been 
compared with a modified Quick Cost Model that assumes a 50 
percent fixed-variable cost relationship in the aggregate 
among support AEs. Results so far indicate a close comparison 
exists between actual and estimated budget expenditures, 
apparently reflecting the trend towards a more variable 
behavior in support AE cost while force infrastructure is 
reduced. 
Utilizing the O&S cost data determined from Table 7 for 
MRSC-DS, and Table 14 for MRSC-2015, as well as the overall 
size of each MRSC (using MRSC-DS as the 100 percent Notional 
Force Level), a plot of Notional O&S Costs versus Notional 
Force Level was developed. Also included on the plot were the 
historical and 100 percent fixed-variable O&S cost 
relationships. In Appendix L, Figure L-1, the data point for 
MRSC-2015, using the updated support AE cost relationship, 
appears below the historical cost line. This reflects the 
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increasingly variable (and less fixed) nature of support AE 
cost behavior as infrastructure is reduced. Extending this 
line further, a projected fixed-variable cost relationship can 
be plotted. If one to include the 0 percent Notional force 
level, a total O&S cost curve as a function of force level, 
represented by the dashed line, can be sketched. This line 
decreases at a increasing rate, reflecting the economies of 
scale that occur in the production of O&S activities. (Franck 
and Hildebrandt, 1993, p. 23) 
C. CAPITAL SERVICES VALUE AND O&S COSTS 
1. comparing MRSCs 
A useful examination is to compare and contrast MRSC-
DS with the MRSC-2015 with regard to O&S costs and capital 
services values. Presented in Chapters III and IV were 
various force elements (i.e., aircraft carriers, Navy tactical 
air, Navy support air, surface combatants and submarines, 
amphibious ships, support and auxiliary ships, MEB(s) without 
air, USMC logistics air, USMC tactical air, weapons/ordnance 
and space assets}. In those two chapters, ratios relating 
force element O&S cost to force element capital services 
value, force element O&S cost to total MRSC capital services 
value, and force element capital services value to total MRSC 
capital services value were developed. 
Presented in Appendix L, Figures L-2A through L-7F, 
summaries of the O&S and capital services value results are 
displayed and compared between the MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015. 
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a. Capital Services Values 
Figures L-2A and L-2B display the contribution of 
force element capital services value to total MRSC capital 
services value (excluding space) for MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015 
respectively. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from 
comparing the data between the two MRSCs. For MRSC-1990, the 
four largest contributors to total capital services value are 
(in order) Navy tactical air (25.3 percent), surface 
combatants and submarines ( 23.6 percent) , and Navy support air 
and support and auxiliary ships (9.8 percent). Comparing this 
result with the MRSC of 2015, the top four contributors were 
Navy tactical air (26.3 percent), surface and submarines (23.4 
percent), weapons (18.3 percent), and amphibious ships (7.5 
percent) . 
Analyzing this data, it is obvious that force 
elements such as ships and planes, which will be relied upon 
well into the next century, will continue to make up a large 
portion of each dollar invested in military capital stock for 
the MRSC of the future. Naturally, Navy tactical air will 
have some new programs such as the F-ll7N and the F/A-18 E/F, 
yet these should not absorb the amount of R&D costs that 
newer, unproven systems (e.g., space and weapons) may require. 
As discussed, weapons and ordnance capital 
services value occupy a 11 larger share of the pie. 11 Recall 
from Chapter IV, MRSC-2015 has a host of new weapons systems, 
not all of which will be operational until sometime after the 
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year 2000 (due to the 15 year service life of weapons). As a 
result, the 1:1 procurement to R&D ratio holds true here, and 
thus contributes to the rise in cost of the capital services 
value. 
In Figure L-3, a comparison between the capital 
stock value and capital services value for each of the MRSCs 
is displayed. First, it is important to note here the huge 
difference between the capital stock and capital services 
values for each of the MRSCs. This signifies the importance 
of factoring in service life when determining an appropriate 
level of yearly investment (procurement & R&D) to maintain 
this force. Secondly, the difference in capital stock value 
for MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015 represents additional costs to 
develop and procure new platforms and systems. Although 
smaller in number, R&D and procurement costs will cause the 
capital stock (as well as capital services) value to be higher 
for MRSC-2015. 
:b. o&s costs 
Figures L-4A and L-4B show the breakdown between 
force element of O&S costs for MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015 respec-
tively. Figure L-5 compares overall O&S costs and also the 
breakdown between primary, related and support AEs. In 
analyzing Figures L-4A and 4B, it is clear that not much of a 
change in the weight of contribution of each force element 
occurs between the two MRSCs. Although decreasing in number, 
other force elements (e.g., Navy support aircraft) increase as 
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a percentage of O&S costs due to the fact that more dramatic 
reductions occur in other force elements (e.g. , support, 
auxiliary and amphibious ships). This reflects the need to 
support fewer overall ships and employ only one MEB, resulting 
in these force element O&S costs being reduced by more than 
one-third. Accordingly, as shown in Figure L-5, total O&S 
costs decrease by approximately 25% from MRSC-DS to MRSC-2015. 
This is in line with expectations for a MRSC that goes from 
123 ships and six aircraft carriers to 84 ships and four 
aircraft carriers. 
It is now worthwhile to bring together both the 
O&S costs and the capital services values of each MRSC to 
compare yearly cost. Total O&S cost is basically that amount 
of yearly appropriations required to man, operate and maintain 
the readiness of forces. Capital services value is basically 
the level of investment (procurement) needed each year to 
maintain military capital inventories, compensating for loss 
or retirement. It includes the costs of R&D for new 
platforms, as well as procurement costs. Recall that existing 
platform capital services values excludes the cost of R&D, 
considering that to be a "sunk cost." 
In Figure L-6, a comparison is made between MRSC-
DS and MRSC-2015 with regard to the O&S costs, capital 
services value, and total yearly cost. MRSC-2015 requires 
approximately 1.25 times the capital services value but only 
.75 times the O&S costs. In addition overall yearly cost of 
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MRSC-2015 as compared with MRSC-DS is approximately 10 percent 
less! 
c. Ratio Analysis 
As presented in Tables 8 and 15, a set of ratios 
was developed for each MRSC to analyze O&S costs and capital 
services values of the various force elements. Displayed in 
Figures L-7A through L-7E are graphic comparisons of this 
data. 
Figure L-7A and L-78 compare O&S costs to capital 
services values between MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015, and show that 
the most dramatic changes occur in the following force 
elements; carriers, surface combatants and submarines, MEB(s), 
and amphibious ships. For carriers, this can be attributed to 
the high O&S cost conventionally powered platforms being 
replaced by a lesser number of more capital-intensive, yet 
efficient, nuclear powered ships. As a result, O&S costs are 
dramatically reduced, while capital services value increases 
slightly, thus providing for the decrease. Surface combatants 
and submarines display a similar relationship, with older 
steam-driven surface combatants being reduced in number and 
replaced by more capable and efficient gas turbine-powered 
ships, while submarine platform design remains fundamentally 
unchanged. The change in the MEB(s) force element reflects 
the reduction of two MEBs to one MEB with upgraded equipment. 
This results in substantially lower O&S costs due to manpower 
reductions, yet only a marginal decrease in capital services 
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value due to having more capable equipment. Lastly, the 
amphibious ship force element reflects the dramatic reduction 
in the numbers of ships required, thus reducing O&S costs. 
Despite containing fewer vessels, amphibious ship capital 
services value actually increases with the acquisition of 
these more capable ships. 
Figures L-7C and L-70 compare force element O&S 
cost to total capital services value between MRSC-DS and MRSC-
2015. The force elements of carriers, surface combatants and 
submarines, MEB(S), and amphibious ships exhibit a similar 
relationship as previously discussed. This is expected, since 
the capital services value contribution for each force element 
as a percentage of total capital services value (as shown in 
Figures L-2A and L-2B) remained basically the same between 
MRSC-DS and MRSC-2015. The difference is primarily due to the 
change in O&S costs alone. 
one added exception is the support and auxiliary 
ship force element. As shown in Figure L-7A, its O&S costs to 
capital services value ratio remains basically unchanged. 
However, when compared to the total capital services value, 
support and auxiliary ship O&S costs contribute significantly 
less (.191 vs .365). This is mainly due to this force element 
contributing only one-half as much (4.9 vs 9.8 percent) 
towards total capital value that increases between the two 
MRSCs. As a result, the smaller force element contribution is 
reflected in this ratio. 
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Figures L-7E and 7F reinforce the analysis 
conducted when comparing O&S costs to both capital services 
values and total capital services values. support and 
auxiliary ships show the most dramatic reduction, which is due 
mainly to the fewer number of ships needed to support the 
MRSC-2015 without requiring a equivalent offset in an increase 
in force element capital value. The MEB(s) and USMC tactical 
air force elements show similar reductions in their ratios, 
reflecting the smaller numbers of these force elements without 
a corresponding increase in capital value. 
2. Space 
Now that an examination of the cost of each MRSC has 
been conducted without space, it is now appropriate to analyze 
space with regard to capital services value, O&S costs, and 
total yearly cost. Figure L-8 displays capital services 
value, total O&S and total yearly cost to support the space 
forces element for each MRSC. The MRSC-DS space force element 
required approximately $4. a billion (FY 1990 dollars) to 
sustain on a yearly basis, while MRSC-2015, with a capability 
to engage in land warfare, would cost about $20 billion on a 
yearly basis. (Wolfert, 1993, p. 23, SIS, 1993, p. 38) 
D. TWO MRSCs 
In this section, two issues are developed: first, 
economies of scale evident when combining two MRSCs without 
space with the space force element, and second, the issue of 
aircraft carrier opportunity cost associated with organizing 
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one or two MRSCs, and how that might affect other Navy global 
commitments. 
l. Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale occur when the average cost of a 
unit declines with increases in output. Even though the cost 
continues to increase with increasing production, it does so 
at a decreasing rate, so that on the margin, the unit cost is 
decreasing. Despite the significant investment in developing, 
procuring and operating a space force element, this element 
can be used for more than one MRSC, and as a result, the cost 
of a second MRSC, based around four aircraft carriers and one 
MEB, is much less expensive. 
Figure L-9 puts into this perspective the concept of 
economies of scale. Listed on the horizontal axis is one 
MRSC-2015, two MRSC-2015s, and the total inventory of 
platforms and assets (space, ships, planes, weapons and 
equipment) required to sustain two MRSC-2015s. This last 
grouping assumes that 80 percent of all Navy and Marine afloat 
platforms and assets are involved, with the remainder being in 
transit off station, or unavailable due to maintenance or 
overhaul. {This infers that 20 percent of the overall 
inventory of platforms would not be available at any one time 
due to lengthy and complex maintenance already in progress, or 
having just completed extended overseas operations). 
Figure L-9 shows that with the combination of a second 
MRSC to the original MRSC presented (twice the effectiveness), 
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the cost increases by less than 50 percent. This takes into 
consideration that the space force element, as a fixed cost, 
can be utilized by both MRSC-2015s. (Each MRSC uses the same 
satellites for communication, navigation, intelligence etc.) 
(Wolfert, 1994) As a result, a decrease is experienced in the 
unit cost of acquiring and supporting an additional MRSC. The 
final category is the total inventory of Navy and Marine 
afloat platforms and assets needed to sustain the presence of 
two MRSC-2015s in different regions of the world. This shows 
only a 15 percent increase in cost when assuming that 80 
percent of the Navy and Marine Corps assets are available for 
a short period of time. Reductions in ship and plane 
inventory requirements could be achieved if an opportunity 
arises where each MRSC-2015 could operate in the same general 
region of the world (e. g. , Mediterranean Sea and Indian 
Ocean). If this were the case, yearly costs for two MRSC-
2 015s could probably be more closely estimated using the 
middle column. 4 
2. Aircraft carrier Opportunity cost 
With the reduction in the force structure of the Navy, 
the question needs to be asked, "How does the employment of 
aircraft carriers organized around the concept of a MRSC 
affect the Navy's ability to address other global 
commitments?" Traditionally, the aircraft carrier has been 
4For MRSC-2015, since R&D cost is amortized instead of 
being treated as a fixed or entry cost, economies of scale are 
less pronounced in these calculations. 
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seen as a stabilizing influence overseas, providing an symbol 
of U.S. resolve and commitment. As the number of aircraft 
carriers decline, how might that impact regional commitments 
in other parts of the globe when the U.S. is involved in one 
or possibly two near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts? 
Assuming that each MRC would require one MRSC consisting of 
four aircraft carriers each, what type of overseas presence in 
other parts of the globe might the Navy be able to sustain? 
These are all questions that need to b evaluated. 
Recent studies have focused on t.: . .a long-term peacetime 
operating tempo of aircraft carriers and the Navy in general 
to determine an adequate size force to maintain. (O'Rourke, 
1991, p. CRS-1) Of concern were things such as maintaining a 
50 percent personnel tempo, as well as supporting and 
completing all scheduled maintenance periods. 
However, during a crises, when one or nearly two 
simultaneous MRCs develop, peacetime operating concerns could 
be expected to be discarded. Long-term operating tempo is 
replaced by short-term station-keeping abilities. A station-
keeping multiplier is the number of total carriers needed to 
maintain one on station somewhere in the world. Thus, how 
would the formation of one, or even two MRSCs, with four 
aircraft carriers each, affect u.s. commitments in other parts 
of the world? 
To appreciate this dilemma, one only has to look as 
far back as the Persian Gulf War. During the five months of 
92 
Desert Shield, the u.s. maintained 3 to 5 out of an inventory 
of 14 aircraft carriers in the area. This was an implied 
short-term station-keeping multiplier of 2.8 to 4.7. 
(O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-19) During the five weeks of Desert 
Storm, the u.s. maintained 6 aircraft carriers in the area, 
which implied a short-term multiplier of 2.3. 
Assuming the U.S. was to form one MRSC, and still 
maintain the inventory of 11 active and one training aircraft 
carriers, no more than 7 carriers would be available. (One 
aircraft carrier would be assumed to be in a complex overhaul 
and not available for at least 90 days). However, to 
numerically form a second MRSC, the short-term multiplier 
attained during Desert Storm would be exceeded. (7 divided by 
4 = 1. 75). In fact, if 8 carriers formed two MRSCs in 
different parts of the world (e.g., Western Pacific and 
Mediterranean Sea), the United States would only have three 
carriers to relieve or replace deployed carriers--a situation 
that could not be sustained for a prolonged period of time. 
In conclusion, aircraft carrier opportunity cost would 
impact in two distinct ways: deferred maintenance, and 
peacetime overseas operating commitments which may go 
unfulfilled. 
E. TOOTH-TO-TAIL 
Mentioned earlier in this chapter was the concept of the 
"tooth-to-tail" ratio that relates in terms of costs the 
"precision strike power" (tooth) of the MRSC to the necessary 
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support required to sustain the MRSC (tail). With limited 
resources available for future force planning, this is a 
useful concept that can be introduced here and considered by 
DOD planners for additional refinement and clarification. 
The terminology "precision strike power" (tooth) refers to 
those platforms in the MRSC that are directly involved in 
providing for ordnance delivery to the target or objective. 
Another way to look at it would be to say to oneself .... 
"What assets or platforms do I consider most capable in 
initiating power projection from the sea and hence, consider 
most valuable?" This group of assets and platforms would be 
different than those required to maintain power projection 
from the sea. Naturally, there would be some overlap, as in 
the case of aircraft carriers that not only launch tactical 
aircraft but also recover and ready them for additional 
sorties, yet that could be interpreted as a secondary role). 
The aircraft carrier's most important role, its one primary 
mission, is initiating air strikes by getting a plane off the 
deck and over the objective with ordnance on target. Recovery 
is secondary. In this instance, the aircraft carrier platform 
would be considered "tooth", not "tail". 
Utilizing this distinction, the following force elements 
are considered to be part of the "tooth": aircraft carriers, 
Navy tactical aircraft (A-6 1 F-14 1 F-117N, F-18) , surface 
combatants (including minesweepers), submarines, amphibious 
ships, MEB(s) without USMC air, both USMC tactical (AV-8B, AH-
1/UH- 1, OH-58) and logi stics (CH- 53, CH-46, and V-22) a i r , and 
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weapons and ordnance. Platforms considered to be part of the 
"tail" would be Navy support aircraft, support and auxiliary 
ships. (Due to the fact that space assets are not casted out 
in the same manner as other force elements of the MRSC, they 
are excluded from this analysis). 
Once assets and platforms are segregated into a tooth or 
tail role, an examination of relevant O&S costs needs to be 
determined in order to realistically develop a useful cost 
relationship. Recall that O&S costs are separated into three 
categories: primary, related, and support AEs. Primary AE 
O&S costs are those associated with direct operation of a 
platform, such as operating a ship at sea. Related AE O&S 
costs are indirectly associated with the ship, such as 
maintaining and manning command and control facilities ashore. 
Lastly, support AE O&S costs are those least closely 
associated with the platform's operation, including such items 
as maintenance, housing and medical support. 
Accordingly, only the primary AE O&S costs of those assets 
and platforms involved in initiating precision strike are 
included in the "tooth" category. All other O&S costs -- the 
related and support AE costs of the "tooth" platforms, as well 
as all other primary, related, and support AE costs of the 
remainder of the platforms and assets -- are considered part 
of the "tail." 
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It is approp::- iate to express this ratio in a useful 
relationship, incorporating both the capital services values 
and the O&S costs discussed above: 
Tooth FE(C Svcs Value+Pri AE) 
Tooth FE(Rel AEs+Supp AEs) +Tail FE(C Svcs Value +All AEs) 
where FE stands for Force Element. Stated differently: 
(Capital Svcs Val + Pr i 0/ S Cost ) Ini t 
(Capital Svcs Val +All O/S) Maint +Other O/S of Init 
where the numerator represents the cost to initiate, and the 
denominator the cost to maintain, a precision striking 
capability. 
Using the data from Chapters III and IV, Figure L-10 
shows a comparison of the tooth-to-tail ratios between MRSC-DS 
and MRSC-2015. Comparing the two graphs, for MRSC-DS, it is 
obvious that tooth is $7.324 billion as compared to tail of 
$6.119 billion (roughly a 7:6 ratio). For MRSC-2015, tooth is 
$7.521 billion as compared to a tail of $4.585 billion 
(roughly a 7:4 ratio). The more favorable ratio of 7:4 for 
MRSC-2015 reflects an increasingly effective and efficient 
force, able to perform its assigned mission without requiring 
as significant a support structure. Recall that in 
considering distinctions between what was considered tooth and 
what was considered tail, the former included platforms and 
assets required to initiate, whereas the latter maintained, 




Presently, several different issues are in the process of 
shaping the u.s. Navy and Marine Corps of the future. Among 
these are the MTR, new strategic concepts in warfighting, 
fiscal and resource constraints, and the unwillingness of the 
United States to sustain high numbers of casualties in future 
conflicts. This thesis has attempted incorporate these 
concerns and determine how the size and composition of the 
U.S. Navy, built around the concept of the MRSC, may change as 
it enters the 21st Century. An MRSC is not the only answer 
available to Navy force planners, programmers and budgeters, 
but it may provide a new framework whereby "reactive" planning 
may be replaced by "proactive" planning. It does not address 
all roles or missions of the Navy and Marine Corps, but rather 
concentrates on their ability to quickly respond to two near 
simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts as envisioned in the 
BUR. It is an attempt to determine resource requirements to 
fit the strategy, not the other way around. 
Navy and Marine Corps forces developed around the concept 
of MRSC-2015 are similar in many ways to MRSC-DS. MRSC-2015 
can be forward deployed and have the flexibility and staying 
power to respond as the first forces on the scene in any u.s. 
involvement in Major Regional Conflicts. Manned aircraft, 
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such as stealth fighters and attack planes, continue to 
operate from aircraft carriers at sea in support of MRSC-
2015' s deep-strike role. In addition, surface combatants, 
submarines, and mobile amphibious forces engaging in 
"operational maneuver from the sea," provide MRSC-2015 with 
a littoral as well as deep-strike capability against enemy 
forces. What is fundamentally different between MRSC-DS and 
MRSC-2015 is the fusion of space system capabilities with 
afloat Navy and Marine Corps assets that gives MRSC-2015 
"information dominance" of the battlespace against the enemy. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Future Navy and Marine Corps forces developed around the 
concept of MRSC-2015 are fewer in number by approximately one-
third when compared to MRSC-DS. Composition of MRSC-2015 
remains approximately the same as MRSC-DS, with some force 
elements decreasing by more than one-third (e.g., the number 
of MEBs from two to one) , and some less (e.g. , surface; 
submarine force element due to the increase in minesweepers). 
O&S costs are becoming more variable as layers of infra-
structure are reduced in the current downsizing underway in 
DOD. In analyzing the top line of the entire DOD, an 
estimated so percent fixed-variable factor for all support AEs 
resulted in a close approximation of estimated model expendi-
tures with actual budget expenditures from FY 1990-93. In the 
Quick Cost Model, this assumed 50 percent fixed-variable 
factor was used in calculation of support AEs for MRSC-2015. 
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However, if significant additional downsizing occurs, the 
long-run total O&S curve should continue to become 
increasingly variable, and approach a 100 percent fixed-
variable factor as shown in Figure L-1. 
Navy tactical air O&S costs actually increased from MRSC-
1990 to MRSC-2015, despite the number of aircraft decreasing 
by more than one-third. Navy support air O&S costs remained 
about the same, while their numbers also decreased. The 
behavior in aircraft O&S costs is probably due to changes in 
the fixed-variable percent for support AEs, some of which had 
fixed-variable percent originally higher than the assumed 50 
percent used in MRSC-2015. As a result, aircraft O&S costs 
for MRSC-2015 would be greater than anticipated for a given 
force level. In addition, the F-14 aggregate element was used 
for input into the model for the F-117N, since the Stealth 
fighter has not been introduced into the fleet. Finally, no 
distinc-tion was made between the current F-18 A/B & C/D with 
the follow-on E/F model. Thus, any O&S cost savings 
engineered into the later aircraft are discounted. 
O&S costs for MRSC-2015 are approximately 25 percent less 
than for MRSC-DS. This is expected due to the reduced number 
of platforms in MRSC-2015. In particular, most force element 
O&S costs were reduced proportional to the change in the 
number of platforms (i.e. , approximately one-third) . As 
discussed, Navy tactical air O&S cost actually increased, 
while Navy support air remained constant. This resulted in an 
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overall decrease in O&S cost between MRSCs closer to 28 
percent. 
Capital services value increases by approximately 29 
percent from MRSC-DS to MRSC-2015. This shows a shift in 
funding on a long-term yearly basis from O&S to capital stock 
development and acquisition. As a result, the need to 
recapitalize the fleet, through investment in the procurement 
and R&D accounts, becomes an increasingly dominant part of the 
overall budget. This conclusion was supported by using broad 
estimates for procurement and R&D ratios into the 21st 
century, which may require additional refinement and scrutiny. 
Weapons and ordnance capital services value increased by 
approximately a factor of three from MRSC-DS to MRSC-2015. 
MRSC-2015 relies significantly on a new family of stand-off 
precision strike weapons, which allow many of the 
11 traditional 11 platforms of MRSC-DS to maintain useful roles 
for MRSC-2015. Recall that weapons are assumed to have a 
service life of 15 years, and as a result, are all procured 
after the year 2000 for MRSC-2015. Accordingly, a 1:1 ratio 
for procurement to R&D was utilized, adding to a significant 
cost increase in acquiring new weapons. 
Space occupies a larger share of capital services value in 
MRSC-2015, escalating by more than a factor of four. This is 
primarily due to space assets having an assumed 10 year 
service life, and as a result, a 1:1 procurement to R&D 
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ratio. Space O&S cost mirrors the increase in capital 
services value, showing a dramatic rise between MRSC-DS and 
MRSC-2015. Recall that all space costs are only a broad 
approximation, yet underline the increase in investment 
(procurement and R&D) and O&S costs that are likely to be 
needed to field and maintain the required space-based 
capability to support MRSC-2015. 
The concept of tooth-to-tail illustrates the improvement 
in the precision striking power in MRSC-2015 for a given level 
of support. With a reduction in the number of support and 
auxiliary, as well as amphibious ship force elements, along 
with the increases in stand-off weaponry, the tooth-to-tail 
ratio improves for MRSC-2015. As a result, MRSC-2015 appears 
to be configured to better support power projection from the 
sea onto land. 
Given the size and composition of one MRSC-2015, how 
affordable would it be to be able to provide the capability to 
support two near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts, each 
with its own MRSC-2015? Recall that in Figure L-9, assuming 
a 80 percent availability of Navy and Marine Corps forces over 
the short-term, approximately $50 billion (FY 1990 dollars) is 
needed in investment and O&S costs (in Navy, Marine Corps and 
Air Force accounts) on a yearly basis. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The capital services value of a Navy configured around the 
concept of one MRSC-2015 is $5.43 billion (FY 1990 dollars), 
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and $10.86 billion (FY 1990) for two MRSC-2015s. To allow for 
a 80 percent availability of forces, capital services value 
rises to $13.575 billion (FY 1990 dollars). O&S costs for one 
MRSC-2015 is $6.676 billion (FY 1990 dollars), and $13.352 
billion for two MRSC-2015s. Allowing for a 80 percent 
availability of forces, O&S costs rise to $16.690 billion (FY 
1990 dollars). Combining capital services values with O&S 
costs, and adding the estimated $20 billion (FY 1990) of space 
asset capital service value and O&S cost, the total is $50.265 
billion (FY 1990 dollars) necessary to engage in two near 
simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts. 
The size of a Navy configured around the concept of an 
MRSC is reduced by approximately one-third when comparing 
MRSC-DS with MRSC-2015. The Navy configured around MRSC-2015 
maintains many of the same platforms and assets as in MRSC-DS. 
However, additional emphasis is placed on stand-off precision 
weaponry and stealth technologies. Increased emphasis on 
joint operations is the result of the total integration and 
fusion of space systems with Navy and Marine Corps assets, 
resulting in a synergistic effect in improving mission 
capability. 
The O&S cost to capital services value ratio changes from 
approximately 2.2 for MRSC-DS to approximately 1.3 for MRSC-
2015. This represents the increased emphasis needed for 
recapitalization, and the reduced costs of maintaining a 
smaller and more efficient force of MRSC-2015. 
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Several challenges were encountered when attempting to 
estimate the cost of MRSC-2015, both for capital services 
values and O&S costs. For capital services values, assump-
tions had to be made with regard to an R&D to procurement cost 
ratio for investing in the force of the future. This ratio 
was a broad approximation, and most likely contributed to some 
distortion of the capital services value for MRSC-2015. Space 
capital services value was a rough estimate of costs 
associated with developing and acquiring systems for MRSC-
2015, and did not contain the accuracy of other data. As a 
result, separate analyses of MRSC-2015 (without space) and 
MRSC-2015 (with space) were conducted in an effort to compare 
force elements. In addition, assumptions had to be made as to 
what types of platforms and weapons the Navy and Marine Corps 
would acquire for MRSC-2015 such as the MX, the 21st Century 
strike destroyer, and HELLWEPS. 
For O&S costs, several platforms such as the DDG-51 
destroyer, minesweepers, and V-22, were not in the Quick Cost 
Model database. As a result, substitutions had to be made 
that closely approximated the desired platforms. When 
entering platform types as inputs into the Quick Cost Model, 
older DDG-2/37 class destroyers were used for the DDG-51, 
patrol combatants for minesweepers, and CG-47 cruisers for the 
21st century strike destroyer. In addition, the CH-46 was 
used for the v-22, and the F-14 for the F-117N. Another 
difficulty was that the Quick Cost Model did not differentiate 
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between classes of amphibious ships. For instance, in the 
model, the huge LHA or LHD-class amphibious assault ships had 
the same O&S cost as the smaller LST tank landing ships. 
These two classes of ships are very different in size and 
mission, and would not be expected to incur the same O&S 
costs. For MEB(s), a fractional estimate of the cost of a 
Marine division was used to approximate O&S costs. One-third 
was used for 1 MEB, and two-thirds for two MEBs. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
With some exceptions (e.g., SLEP for aircraft carriers), 
conversions and upgrades were not considered in the capital 
services value of platforms. The result is that a slight 
undervaluation of the capital services value may have 
occurred, especially in the ship area. Additional study and 
research in this area might be worthwhile to refine the 
capital services value estimates provided. 
Various service life estimates of platforms and assets 
appeared in several references. The author limited selection 
to just one reference in determining the various force element 
service lives. This area may require further refinement and 
investigation, due to the impact of estimating service life on 
recapitalizing forces for the future. 
A broad assumption was made with regard to R&D and 
procurement cost for future investment in forces. One 
potential area of study might be in determining how this ratio 
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may change as the Navy and Marine Corps attempt to develop 
investment strategies for the force of the future. 
A soon to be released (Spring 1994) version of the Quick 
Cost Model should incorporate an updated version of the fixed-
variable percent factors affected by the reduced force infra-
structure. Recomputing and analyzing O&S costs with updated 
fixed-variable percent factors for MRSC-2015 and comparing 
them to these results might be useful. 
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APPENDIX A 
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il Factor Name 
1 ES, Officers 





3 ES, civilian 01600 
4 ES, Resrv.Off. 00060 
00110 
5 ES, NG. Off. None 
6 ES, Resrv.Enl. 00130 
01060 
7 ES,NG. Enl. 
8 BTL Procure. 
9 O&M-Civ.Pay 
10 Mil. Canst. 























RI Title Coefficient 
Active Service-Officer-Navy 1.0 
Active Service-Officer-Me 1.0 
Active Service-Enlisted-Navy 1.0 
Active Service-Enlisted-Me 1.0 
Civilian 
Paid Drill-Officer Resrv. 
Active Res Ofc 









Other Procurement-Navy 1.0 
Procurement-Me 1.0 
Civilian -34.334 
0 & M Reserve-Navy 
0 & M-Navy 
0 & M-MC 
Stock Funds-Navy 
Indust~ial Funds-Navy 
















































































Bunker Hill 1,260,734 
Gates 1,310,011 
Leyte Gulf 976,610 
Mobile Bay 1,179,453 
Normandy 1,150,000 
San Jacinto 1,142,210 


















































Blue Ridge 678,943 
678,943 
LPH 
Iwo Jima 430,165 
Okinawa 415,364 





Class Ship Name Unit Cost 
Other Amphibs 
LSD 
Fort McHenry 446,631 
Germantown 476,120 
Gunston Hall 389,122 





























St. Louis 144,521 
446,519 
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Class Ship Name Unit Cost 
Minesweepers 



















Mount Hood 211,010 









Class Ship Name Unit Cost 
AFS 
Concord 166,678 
Niagara Falls 163,020 
San Jose 155,253 






Cape Cod 386,279 














Note: Costs estimated from the "Historical Costs of Ships 
Information System Database. 11 Washington D.C., Depart-
ment of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 017), 


















CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-AIRCRAFT 
MRS C-DS 
Training Pipeline Other lnv. UnitCost 
.20 .13 4 154 72.0 
.16 .10 5 183 36.9 
.20 .13 2 74 44.9 
.20 .12 5 42 25.2 
.20 .13 2 61 28.8 
.20 .13 1 45 64.5 
.05 .14 0 33 39.6 
.16 .14 3 70 9.8 
.12 .11 11 65 9.8 
.11 .11 7 116 17.0 
.15 .14 8 77 22.6 
.20 .13 2 69 16.8 
.20 .13 2 54 9.8 


















Note: Inventory numbers take into account aircraft needs for 
training, pipeline (maintenance), and other (e . g., R&D). 
To calculate inventory 
E:x:: F-18 1.00/(1.00-. 1 6) = 1.19, 1.19/ (1.00-.10) = 1.32 
1.32 :X: 134 = 177.1, 178 + 5 = 183 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fi scal Requirements Model. 
(CRM 93-158). (Alexandria , VA,. Center for Naval Analyses, 
August 1993) , Table 2. Factors obtained from "Naval Combat 
Aircraft: Issues and Opti ons." Congress of the United States, 
Congressional Budget Office, November 1987, p. 38. All costs 
in thousands of FY 90 dollars. 
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APPENDIX E 
CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AFLOAT 
MRS C-DS 
Quantity Description Unit Cost Total Cost 
2 HQ Command Elements 20,775 41,550 
2 Combat Service 67,883 135,766 
Support Elements 
7 Infantry Battalion 8,693 60,851 
4 Light Armored 5,318 21,272 
Infantry Company 
2 Tank Company 23,458 46,916 
2 Assault Amphibian 23,878 47,756 
Company 
2 Recon Companies 1,011 2,022 
1 Combat Engineer 2,907 2,907 
Company 
1 Anti-Tank Platoon 1,634 1,634 
1 Truck Company Det. 11,112 11,112 
2 Air Control Group 22,358 44,716 
(Rotary Wing) 
subtotal 416,502 
35 Tanks (M-60) 1,500 52,500 
100 Amphibious Assault 900 90,000 
Vehicles (AAVs) 
17 Landing Craft Air 25,000 425,000 
Cushion (LCACs) 
150 Light Armored 1,000 150,000 
Vehicles (LA Vs) 
13 Landing Craft Utility 15,000 195,000 
Total .i,J29,002 
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Note: Costs taken from Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO 
P7000.14K), Washington, D.C., HQMC, 14 June 1991, Table 
6B2 for National Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 
Resource Costs. Assumes Two MEBs afloat. Does not 
include the cost of Marine fixed-wing aircraft, which is 
under APN. Assumes afloat fixed-wing aircraft control 
group integrated with carrier air wing. Order of battle 
taken from u.s. Marines in the Gulf, 1990-1991, 
Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. (Washington, 
D.C., HQ USMC. 1992), and author's estimate. Costs in 












CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-SPACE ASSETS 
MRS C-DS 
Asset GrndCon UserCon Booster 
DSCS 150 150 120 
FLTSATCOM 100 100 80 
LEASAT -s 75 60 
MACSAT 25 25 20 
DSP 150 150 120 
DMSP 50 50 40 
GPS 75 75 60 












Note: Information taken from Jane's Space Directory CJSD) 
(1993- 1 994) (Surrey, U.K. Jane's Information Group, Inc. 
1993) , pp. 185-206, New Technology for NATO-Implementing 
Follow-On Forces Attack. (Washington, D.C., Office of 
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. June 1987), Table 
2-2, (Wolfert, 1994) and author's cost estimates for 
some assets. GPS was still not fully deployed at the 
time of the Persian Gulf War. LEASAT was leased for a 
period of time, then subsequently purchased. Assumes 
the following cost breakdown: 25% Ground Control, 25% 
User Control, 20% Booster and 30% Satellite. * Denotes 
several. All costs in millions of FY 90 dollars. 
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CAPITAL STOCK VALUE - WEAPONS 
MRSC-DS 















































Type Quantity Unit cost Cost 
TALD 300 18 5, 400 
UAV 50 1,000 50,000 
AMMO 334,000 
Total: 5,204,916 
Note: Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements 
Model. (CRM 93-158). (Alexandria, VA. Center for 
Naval Analyses, August 1993), Table 4, FY 1995 Budget 
and Revised FY 1994 Budget Plan Submission to the 
Secretary of Defense CBlue Book) and P-1 Annex. 
Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 15 October 
1993, 11 Unit Costs for all Up Round G.P. Bombs and GBU-
24B," Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command 
Memorandum dated 17 Feb 1994, Marine Corps Cost Factor 
Manual (MCO P7000. 14K), Table 6B2, Washington, D.C., 
HQMC, 14 June 1991, and author's estimate. Costs in 












CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-SHIPS 
MRSC-2015 








Key West 678,764 















Bunker Hill 970,716 
Lake Champlain 976,610 
Leyte Gulf 1,179,453 
Mobile Bay 1,193,903 
Philippine Sea 1,169,088 
Princeton 1,142,210 
san Jacinto 1,310,011 




































Fort McHenry 446,631 
Germantown 476,120 



























































Cape Cod 386,279 
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(*) New Platform 8,738,760 
R&D: 
Total: 72,029,644 
Note: Costs estimated from Review of the FY 1994/1995 Budget. 
Department of the Navy, Off ice of the Comptroller. 
Washington, D.C., 14 Oct 93, p. 1, "Historical Costs of 
Ships Information System Database. Washington, D.C., 
Department of the Navy, Naval Sea ·Systems Command (SEA 
017), April 1992. "A Capable, Affordable 21st Century 
Destroyer," Naval Engineers Journal. May 1993, pp. 
213-221, The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model CCBM 93-
158), Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, August 
1993, Tabl·e 4., and "Selected Options for Enhancing 
Naval Options in Regional Conflicts." Washington D.C., 
Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget 

















CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-AIRCRAFT 
MRSC 2015 
Training Pipline Other lnv. Unit 
Cost 
.20 .13 3 84 87.1 
.16 .10 5 196 50.0 
.20 .12 5 45 25.2 
.20 .13 2 43 28.8 
.20 .13 1 30 64.5 
.05 .14 0 27 39.6 
.16 .14 3 39 9.8 
.12 .11 11 22 9.8 
.11 .11 14 71 40.0 
.15 .14 3 86 22.6 
.20 .13 1 36 16.8 
.20 .13 1 36 9.8 
.14 .13 7 14 8.0 
Subtotal: 


















Note: Inventory numbers take into account aircraft needs for 
training, pipeline (maintenance), and other (e.g., R & 
D). To calculate inventory: 
Ex: F-18 1.00/(1.00-.16) = 1.19, 1.19/(1.00-.10) = 1.32 
1.32 X 144 = 190.1, 191 + 5 = 196 
All costs in millions of FY 1990 dollars. All procurement to 
R&D ratios for new aircraft (*) assumed to be 1.5:1. 
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Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model 
(CRM 93-158}. (Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analyses, 
August 1993), Table 2, "Lockheed Pushes F-ll7N for Navy Deep-
Strike Role," [lyiation Week & Space Technology, 13 September 
1993, pp. 96-97, "Options for Fighter and Attack Aircraft: 
Costs and Capabilities," Washington D.c., CBO Staff 
Memorandum, May 1993, and author's estimate. 
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APPENDIX J 
CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AFLOAT 
MRSC 2015 
Quantity Description Unit cost Total cost 
1 HQ Command Element 20,227 20,227 
1 Combat Service Support 67,883 67,883 
Element 
2 Infantry Battalions 8,693 17,386 
2 Light Armored Infantry 5,318 10,636 
Company 
1 Tank Company 23,458 23,458 
1 Assault Amphibian 23,878 23,878 
Company 
1 Recon Company 1,011 1,011 
1 Combat Engineer company 2,907 2,907 
1 Anti-Tank Platoon 1,634 1,634 
1 Truck Company Det. 11,112 11,112 
1 Air Control Group 22,358 22,358 
(Rot.) 
subtotal 202,490 
17 Tanks (M1A1) 3,000 51,000 
50 Adv. Amphibious Assault 2,200 110,000 
Veh. (AAAVs) 
24 Landing Craft Air 25,000 600,000 
Cushion (LCACs) 




Note: costs estimated from Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual 
MCO P7000.14K, June 1991, Table 6B-2, Cost and 
capability Evaluation of the Marine Corps Combined Arms 
Regiment (CAR). (Monterey, California. Naval 
Postgraduate School Thesis, December 1993) , pp. 7-10 and 


























CAPITAL STOCK VALUE-WEAPONS 
MRSC-2015 














































FIGURES L1 - LlO 
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Type Quantity Unit Cost Cost 
CRUV 48 8,500 425,000 
VTOL 16 11,000 176,000 
AMMO 166,000 
subtotal: 7,445,138 
( 1: 1) New Weapon R&D: 7,445,138 
Total: 14,890,276 
Note: Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements 
Model. CCBM 93-158), Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval 
Analyses, August 1993, Table 4, "Selected Options for 
Enhancing Naval capability in Regional conflicts", 
(Washington, D.C., CBO Staff Memorandum, June 1993), 
"Naval Anti-Missile Laser is Readied for sea," Defense 
Electronics, April 1993, p. 19, "Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles-Still a Top DOD Priority." Defense 
Electronics, March 1993, pp. 36-44, "Annual Report to 
the President and Congress, n Washington, D.C., 
Department of Defense, January 1994, and author's 
estimate. Costs in thousands of constant FY90 dollars. 
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Figure L-1 
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MRSC-2015 Economies of Scale 
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Navy Attack Jet 
Marine Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Destroyer Tender 
New Dry Cargo Ship 
Anununition Ship 
Navy surface ship anti-air warfare system 
Miscellaneous command ship 
Marine Attack Helicopter 
(AMRAAM) Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile 
Fleet Oiler 
Fast Combat Support Ship/Replenishment Oiler 
Aircraft Procurement,Navy 
Submarine Tender 
(ASROC) Anti-Submarine Rocket 
(ATACMs) Army Tactical Missile System 
Salvage and Rescue Ship 
Advanced Major Caliber Light Gun with Precision 
Guided Munitions 
Airborne Warning and Control system 
Budget Authority 
Battleships 
The "Bottom Up Review"-DOD document 




























Command and Control 
Command, Control and communications 
Congressional Budget Office 
Ticonderoga-class Guided Missile Cruiser 
Navy and Marine Medium Lift Helicopter 
Marine Heavy Lift Helicopter 
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War-Report to Congress 
(CRUAV) Close Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Aircraft carrier 
Aircraft carrier Battle Group 
Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier 
Destroyer 
Guided Missile Destroyer 
21st Century Strike Destroyer 
Defense Meteorological Support Program Satellite 
Department of Commerce 
Department of Defense 
Defense Systems Communication Satellite 
Defense Support Pre ·.ram Satellite 
Navy Command and Control & Early Warning Aircraft 
AWACs aircraft 
JSTARs aircraft 
Navy and Marine Electronic Warfare Aircraft 
Navy Fighter aircraft 
Navalized version of Air Force "Stealth Fighter" 




























Guided Missile Frigate 
Family Housing, Navy and Marine Corps 
Surface Combatant Gun and Ammunition 
Fleet Satellite Communication System 
" ... From the Sea"-Navy document 
Fiscal Year 
Future Years (Six Years) Defense Program 
Glide Bomb Unit (refers to a family of air-to-
ground precision guided bombs) 
Global Positioning System 
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile 
(Harpoon)- Air, surface and Submarine-Launched 
anti-ship missile 
Marine Surface-to-Air Missile 
(Hellfire)-Air-to-surface Missile 
(HELLWEPS)-Surface-to-Air Laser Weapon 
" Joint Direct Attack Munition-an air-launched bomb 
Joint Stand-Off Weapon-an air-launched glide weapon 
Joint surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
Thousands of Units 
Marine Light Amphibious Vehicle 
Marine Landing craft Air cushion 
Navy Amphibious Command Ship 
Marine Landing Craft Utility Ship 
Leased Communication Satellite 




























Wasp-class Amphibious Assault Ship 
Amphibious Assualt Ship 
Landing Ship Dock 
Amphibious Assualt Ship 
Marine Abrams Battle Tank 
Air or surface-launched Torpedo 
submarine-launched Advanced Capability (ADCAP) 
torpedo 
Advanced Lightweight Torpedo 
Marine Main Battle Tank 
500 pound air-dropped bomb 
1000 pound air-dropped bomb 
Mobile Area communication Satellite 
(Maverick) Air-to-Surface Missile 
Mine Countermeasures Ship 
Military Construction, Navy 
Military Construction, Naval Reserve 
Mine command Ship 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 
Military Personnel, Navy 
The "Maritime Strategy"-Navy document 
Major Regional Conflict 
Military Technological Revolution 
Minesweeper Transport 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 




























Naval Tactical Communication System 
Army Light Helicopter 
Office of Management and Budget 
Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps 
Operations and Maintenance, Navy 
Other Procurement, Navy 
Operating and Support cost 
Program Element 
Precision Guided Munition 
Phoenix Air-to-Air Missile 
Procurement, Marine Corp• 
Resource Identifier 
Resource Identification Codes 
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps 
Reserve Personnel, Navy 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
Reconnaissance Strike Complex 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
Navy Anti-submarine Aircraft 




Surface ship gun and ammunition 
Battleship gun and ammunition 



























Standoff Land Attack Missile 
Service Life Extension Program 
standoff Area Defense Weapon 
Standoff Point Defense Weapon 
(Sparrow}-Air-to-Air and surface-to-Air Missile 
(SRUAV)-Short Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine 
Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine-seawolf Class 
Standard Surface-to-Air Missile-refers to a family 
of surface-to-air missiles 
Stinger shoulder-launched anti-air missile 
Tactical Air-Launched Decoy 
Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and associated 
weapons 
Task Group 
Tomahawk Cruise Missile 
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided anti-
tank missile 
Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile-air launched 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft 
Vertical Launch System 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing UAV 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Weapons Procurement, Navy 
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